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ABSTRACT 
Kamal Salibi, a recognized Lebanese historian, described Lebanese society as “liberal 
and tolerant, traditional rather than zealous or fanatical in its attitude towards religion and 
political ideology.” Unfortunately, the openness that defined Lebanon’s success also led 
to its failures.  Confessionalism, a fragile political environment resulting in a perpetually 
weak central government, and internal meddling by Lebanon’s neighbors and imperial 
powers have framed its fractured history.  The country of Lebanon is a sum of its parts 
(i.e., religion, politics, economy), parts that can be examined individually but are never 
defined one hundred percent independent of each other.  A part of Lebanon that is often 
underestimated and overlooked is the drug trade, its influence on Lebanese politics and 
the consequences of such a relationship.  In other words, control of narcotics trafficking 
through the Lebanese state has disproportionately influenced the political landscape of 
Lebanon, contributed to the disenfranchisement of many confessional groups—the Shi’a 
in particular, and as a result contributed to the rise of Hezbollah. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Kamal Salibi, a recognized Lebanese historian, described Lebanese society as 
“liberal and tolerant, traditional rather than zealous or fanatical in its attitude towards 
religion and political ideology.”1  Unfortunately, the openness that defined Lebanon’s 
success also led to its failures.  Confessionalism, a fragile political environment resulting 
in a perpetually weak central government, and internal meddling by Lebanon’s neighbors 
and imperial powers have framed its fractured history.  The country of Lebanon is a sum 
of its parts (i.e., religion, politics, economy), parts that can be examined individually but 
are never defined one hundred percent independent of each other.  A part of Lebanon that 
is often underestimated and overlooked is the drug trade, its influence on Lebanese 
politics and the consequences of such a relationship.   
The main argument of this thesis is that control of narcotics trafficking through 
the Lebanese state has disproportionately influenced the political landscape of Lebanon, 
contributed to the disenfranchisement of many confessional groups – the Shi’a in 
particular, and as a result contributed to the rise of Hezbollah.  Elements of this thesis 
will chronicle the volatile history of Lebanon, the genesis and evolution of its political 
system and how it contributed to the development of Hezbollah, but most importantly the 
history of drug trafficking and its influence on the socio-political landscape of Lebanon.    
The key questions to be considered are: How did the drug trade contribute to the 
political landscape of Lebanon? How did that political environment facilitate the drug 
trade?  In what ways did the nexus between politics and drug trafficking contribute to the 
formation of Hezbollah?  
The primary question above is addressed straight away when one considers drugs 
as a commodity – a valuable raw material or primary agricultural product that can be 
bought and sold.  The money generated by drug trafficking in Lebanon bought economic 
advantage, political influence and militia strength.  It was a relatively cheap means by 
                                                 
1 Kamai Salibi, A House of Many Mansions (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), 1. 
 2 
which one confessional group could grow proportionally more powerful than another.  
The Maronites, Sunnis, and to some extent the Druze controlled Lebanese politics but 
also controlled a very important means of economic production – the agriculturally rich 
lands of the Bakaa Valley and southern Lebanon from the latter part of the eighteenth 
century into the civil war period.2  Eventually, the harsh treatment dished out by the 
sectarian government led to a Shi’a awakening that culminated into the formation of 
Hezbollah.  In summary, control of narcotics trafficking enriched those in power and 
enabled them to “solidify economic control of the dominant and more profitable sectors 
of the [legitimate] economy, the services and the commercial sector.”3  It is safe to say 
that the mafia-like means by which Lebanese politics and economics were controlled, 
maximum profit earned in the least amount of time and distributed to a select clientele, 
was another factor piled onto an already large number of Shi’a grievances.  The Shi’a 
responded by providing their own political, economic and military security.         
B. IMPORTANCE 
The fertile soils of the Bekaa Valley and Southern Lebanon were once considered 
the breadbasket of Lebanon.  Their bounty was once able to provide the majority of the 
food for the small country.  Time and circumstances however changed the crops planted 
within the ground there.  A weak central government, a strong economic group of elites, 
and external interference by regional neighbors and international powers contributed to a 
brittle nation.  This unstable nation, made up of unequal parts, was the quintessential 
environment necessary for commodity trade such as narcotics.  In fact, narcotics soon 
replaced grains and Shi’a activism replaced a quiescent regard for political involvement. 
Most scholars would argue that in both instances drug trafficking and Shi’a 
activism arose from the ground out of necessity.  The question to ask is why?  The 
answer is a resounding need for self-preservation. Shi’a activism arose out of neglect by 
                                                 
2 Stefan Winter, The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1788 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 178–179. 
3 Fawwaz Trabulsi, The Role of War in State and Society Transformation - The Lebanese Case, Paper 
presented at the workshop on "War as a Source of State and Social Transformation in the Middle East" 
(Social Science Research Council, Paris, November 2–4, 1994), 15.   
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the central government and the constant threat of interference (be it internal by other 
groups such as the Palestinians or external by Syria or Israel).  Drug cultivation provided 
a much larger rate of return than a food crop such as wheat or olives so survival dictated 
an inclination towards the former.        
Mention the topic of drugs to a group of people and there is bound to be a half 
dozen different reactions ranging from legalization of drugs to frustration with the 
supposed ‘war on drugs’.  Whatever a person’s opinion on illicit drugs, there is no 
argument that drugs are influential commodities around the globe.  According to a 
Conflict Studies report titled, Drug Trafficking After 1992, “drugs turn over more money 
than any other business-after arms trafficking-an estimated 500 billion dollars per 
annum.”4  That is a tremendous amount of money that opens up many opportunities.  One 
of those opportunities is without a doubt political influence.  Lebanon, throughout its 
unstable history, has had a weak central government unable to enforce the rule of law 
outside the capital city.  Ms. Jamieson makes the argument that, “political instability is a 
major factor in the growth of the illicit drugs trade and is one of the biggest obstacles to 
combating it.”5  Bringing this string of thoughts to its logical conclusion leads me to 
propose that drug cultivation and trafficking within and throughout Lebanon has had a 
greater impact on the political landscape of Lebanon than was previously supposed or 
admitted to; in fact, it has contributed to the development of Hezbollah.   
Hezbollah, labeled a “terrorist organization” by the U.S. State Department, was 
responsible for more American deaths than any other group prior to 9/11. Hezbollah, 
however, is not defined solely within definitions placed upon it by the United States 
government.  It is in fact recognized by many within and without the Muslim world as a 
traditional nationalist resistance organization, legitimately meeting the needs of its 
constituency while it fought against what Hezbollah considered a corrupt central 
government.   
                                                 
4 Alison Jamieson, “Drug Trafficking After 1992: A Special Report,” Conflict Studies 250 (1992): 1–
37.  
5 Alison Jamieson, “Global Drug Trafficking,” Conflict Studies 234 (1990): 1–41. 
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Without a doubt, Hezbollah is too complicated to be defined by only one of the 
previous descriptives.  It is more than just a simple celled organism neatly described as a 
‘terrorist’ or ‘nationalist’ organization.  Hezbollah has matured beyond even its 
originators’ aspirations – toppling of the corrupt secular government and establishment of 
an Islamic state.6  Its interests are socio-politically diverse.  Its intentions grounded in 
ideology and economy.  And its reach is global.  Put quite simply, Hezbollah has become 
more than a regionally influential and religiously centered political institution. It is more 
like an international corporation home-based in Lebanon and involved in a plethora of 
international issues to include: religion, politics, terrorism and crime.  
Former Secretary of State Richard Armitage, an obvious proponent of the terrorist 
definition of Hezbollah, is quoted in a 2002 speech when addressing the threat posed by 
Hezbollah as “the A-team of terrorists.”7  The ‘hybrid threat’ posed by Hezbollah creates 
a challenge for the United States because the U. S. government must address Hezbollah 
within the context of Lebanese politics, regional security and global criminality.   
All things considered, Hezbollah did arise because of genuine threat—Palestinian 
threat from within and Israeli invasion from the south.  According to former Israeli Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak, “When we entered Lebanon…there was no Hezbollah…We were 
accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shia in the south.  It was our presence 
there that created Hezbollah.”8  The blatant neglect of Lebanese Shi’a by the central 
government coupled with violence promulgated by Palestinians and Israelis provided 
Hezbollah with a legitimate reason to participate in Lebanese affairs.  Within the context 
of this thesis, Hezbollah will be defined as a nationalist group, existing at the nexus of 
political ideology, religiosity, and criminality.  
                                                 
6 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 34–41.   
7 Eben Kaplain, “The Al-Qaeda-Hezbollah Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11275/alqaedahezbollah_relationship.html.   
8 Augustus Richard Norton, Newsweek, July 18, 2006 cited in Norton, Hezbollah, (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 33.  
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
1. Lebanon  
Literature that addresses the history of Lebanon is broad but centers around four 
main themes familiar within other artificially crafted countries in the Middle East: 
imperial intrusion, fragile central government landscape, sectarian rivalry/violence and 
domestic interference from border countries. 
Imperial powers do not have a track record of lending credence to the most logical 
or amiable means of partitioning lands forfeited following a war.  Large portions of land 
are carved up along unnatural lines, lines that bisect religious and cultural histories.  To 
the victor go the spoils of war, and the European powers indiscriminately drew lines on a 
chart in order to partition up the Levant along economically beneficial lines.  None of the 
resources utilized for this thesis argue that European involvement in this region had 
anything but a negative impact.  In fact, Sandra Mackey summarizes bluntly the vigorous 
rejection of European imperialism by the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon.  According to 
her, the ‘people of the mountain’s’ confessional identity was cemented by the Europeans’ 
greed for territory and wealth.9   In fact, Leonard Binder, in his work on Lebanese 
politics argues that ‘the deeply rooted communalism of Lebanese society’ has resulted in 
a nation ‘lack[ing] that attachment to the national society as a whole, that sense of 
identity…and revolves around an empty center.’10  
A lack of national identity naturally results in a fragile central government unable 
to exercise authority outside of very defined boundaries, boundaries that are dictated by 
the integrity of community beliefs and primordial attachments.  A collective solemnly 
pronounced sentence on Lebanese society, was provided in the edited work by Alnwick 
and Fabyanic: 
Lebanon has been and seems to be destined to remain a fractured 
and divided society.  This fragmentation is not a recent vintage and 
should not be attributed, as it frequently is, to the divisive presence 
of ‘borrowed ideologies’ and other alien groups or forces in the 
                                                 
9 Sandra Mackey, Mirror of the Arab World: Lebanon in Conflict (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2008), 33.  
10 Leonard Binder, Politics in Lebanon (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), 2. 
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society.  Long before the state of Lebanon came into being in 1920, 
it had been an enigmatic and puzzling entity; extremely difficult to 
manage politically or to cement into a viable and integrative social 
fabric.11  
 
Kamal Salibi, in A House of Many Mansions, illustrates why Lebanon was and 
continues to be one of the world's most divided countries because of the continuous 
argument over whose history is closer to the truth. Ironically, in the same book he also 
holds to the opinion that both Christians and Druze have never shown a keener 
consciousness of common identity.  Salibi also proposes that Lebanon cannot afford 
divisiveness, that in order to develop and maintain a sense of political unity, it is 
necessary to distinguish fact from fiction and then build on what is real in the common 
experience of all groups.   
Unfortunately, divisiveness has become a defining attribute of Lebanese culture.  
So engrained in the mindset of the Lebanese is sectarianism that Robert Fisk provided 
this solemn prognosis for Lebanon’s future when he stated, “As long as it is sectarian, 
Lebanon cannot become a modern state.  The problem is that without being sectarian, 
Lebanon will no longer exist.”12 According to Fisk, the very nature of Lebanon is the 
cancer that has been eating away at it since its inception.  It is true that many sectarian 
groups have worked/work together, but it is never for the greater good of Lebanon.  
Rather these relationships of convenience most often resulted in the economic furthering 
of those involved to the detriment of those excluded.  Thus Lebanon existed, and it could 
be argued exists today, balanced between the economic “interests of the upper-class and 
the passions of the lower-class clients.”13 
There does appear to be some argument as to when sectarianism began in the 
region.  Some, like Stefan Winter, argue that sectarianism has been a part of the 
                                                 
11 Lous J. Cantori et al., "Religion and Politics," in Warfare in Lebanon, ed. Kenneth J. Alnwick and 
Thomas Fabyanic (Washington, D.C. : National Defense University, 1988), 43–60. 
12 Robert Fisk, "Who’s Running Lebanon?" in The Independent online, December 15, 2006 
(http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-whos-running-lebanon-
428530.html), 8, cited in Max Weiss, In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shi’ism, and the Making of 
Modern Lebanon (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 5. 
13 Sandra Mackey, Lebanon: Death of a Nation (New York, NY: Doubleday, Publishing, 1989), 72.   
 7 
Levantine landscape for centuries, not always to the detriment of those involved.  When 
one studies Lebanon today, the most disenfranchised group mentioned is the Shi’a.  But, 
according to Winters, “the sectarian, tribal and mercenary character of certain Shiites not 
only posed no obstacle, but virtually recommended them as government tax farmers over 
the local population.”14  Weiss proposes however that sectarianism is best understood 
within the context of modernity by studying the gradual sectarian transformation of the 
Shi’a beginning during the French Mandate.  He states quite plainly that “recent historian 
scholarship on Lebanon has more accurately located the emergence of ‘modern’ 
sectarianism at some point in the nineteenth century.”15  Makdissi supports Weiss’s 
description of sectarianism as modern in the Preface of his book when he states that, 
“sectarianism is an expression of modernity.  Its origins lay at the intersection of 
nineteenth-century European colonialism and Ottoman modernization.”16  Regardless of 
when it began, sectarianism is fuel that feeds the conflicts that have been waged 
throughout Lebanon’s history and must be addressed as such.   
David C. Gordon argues for the inclusion of foreign assistance in order to help 
Lebanon beyond its internal hurts.  He believes “only an effective confrontation of 
[national] identification, of liberty with social equity, and of ‘autonomy with foreign 
assistance’, will provide Lebanon with the opportunity of ceasing to be only an arena of 
international conflict and of becoming a genuinely sovereign republic.”17 According to 
Gordon, imperial interference may have been the cause of Lebanon’s internal conflict, 
but it is also a necessary remedy in this modern age.    
Lastly, in The Phoenix Land: The Civilization of Syria and Lebanon, Robin 
Fedden traces the history of the Syrian/Lebanese region from Ottoman rule to imperial 
mandates.  He utilizes monuments and cities found throughout Syria and Lebanon as 
                                                 
14  Stefan Winter, The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1788 (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 5. 
15  Max Weiss, In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shi’ism, and the Making of Modern Lebanon 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 4. 
16  Ussama Makdisi,  The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-
Century Ottoman Lebanon (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), xi. 
17 David C. Gordon, The Republic of Lebanon: Nation in Jeopardy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1983), 150.    
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stepping-stones into the past in order to understand the present (1965).  It is Fedden’s 
position that Syria and Lebanon are two of the most important - and least known - 
countries of the Near East.  By focusing on particular points of interest - frontiers and 
meeting points between East and West - like a true historian he challenges the reader to 
gain a greater understanding of the current environment by increasing understanding of 
the past.  Fedden asks a very pertinent question about Syria in the closing comments of 
his introduction.  He poses two very important questions that are universal to all non-
Western countries, then and today.  “How is the Syrian [put in any Arabic nationality] to 
preserve all that is fruitful in his Islamic culture, when assimilating so much that runs 
directly counter to it?  How is he to evolve a stable framework of ideas, a dignified and 
decent way of life, from this amalgam of old and new?”  These are relevant questions that 
I dare to say have not been fully answered, but give glimpses into why the East and the 
West continue to struggle.            
2. Shia and Hezbollah   
Most writings cited in this thesis mention Shia within the Levant region beginning 
at the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire or just prior and describe them as a helpless 
minority18.  A reader of such works will unfortunately come away believing that Shia 
have always been victims of tyrannical majorities, unimportant in the social or political 
aspect of the region.  Shia social position has not always been bleak.  According to Stefan 
Winter, the Shia of the Ottoman Empire, although not regional leaders were important 
participants within the Ottoman Empire from the late sixteenth century until the end of 
the eighteenth century and included influential families.  Yes, Shiism is a minority branch 
of Islam, but that does not mean that Lebanese Shia, which gave rise to Amal and 
Hezbollah, have always been in the predicament they faced prior to the first Israeli 
invasion.   
                                                 
18 Hirst, Beware of Small States, 2010. Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, 
and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon, 2000. Norton, Amal and the Shi’a: Struggle for the 
Soul of Lebanon, 1987. Shanahan, The Shi’a of Lebanon: Clans, Parties and Clerics, 2011. Weiss, In the 
Shadow of Sectarianism, 2010.    
 9 
The literature reviewed on Hezbollah approaches the organization from three 
different perspectives.  The first perspective represents Hezbollah as solely an 
ideologically driven terrorist organization bent on the elimination of Israel (the Little 
Satan) and acting as a spoiler to all U.S. (the Great Satan) led policy initiatives in the 
region.  The second looks at Hezbollah as a resistance movement exercising increasing 
political influence within Lebanese politics.  The third perspective is a balanced view, 
showing Hezbollah to be a political resistance organization whose past actions are not 
altogether “clean”, yet which also has demonstrated responsible institutional behavior in 
line with international norms (i.e., providing social services to citizens).  Complex 
problems are rarely solved with simple solutions.  Hezbollah, with its involvement in 
Lebanese politics, terrorist operations, and criminal activities, is by every logical 
descriptive a complex problem that deserves more than a knee-jerk investigation.    
Augustus Norton presents the most well-balanced and concise historical analysis 
on Hezbollah in Hezbollah: A Short History.  He meticulously chronicles the rise of 
Hezbollah from its origins as an offshoot of the southern Lebanese Shi’a group Amal.  
Norton utilizes a historical narrative style, and the theme revolves around the factors 
leading to Hezbollah’s formation.  His narrative encompasses inception of the group to 
late 2006, describing the ramification of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war, and more 
significantly, the play for power Hezbollah made with a call for a unity government.  
Norton’s predictive analysis has borne out in events culminating in Hezbollah achieving 
its goal of establishing a unity government, under President Michel Suleiman in May 
2008.  The current structure of the Lebanese government gives Hezbollah what they have 
been seeking: an “ability to veto government decisions.”19    
A first-hand, historical perspective is offered by Hal Jaber’s, Hezbollah: Born 
with a Vengeance.  She builds upon local interviews with Hezbollah leaders from 
inception of the group, concluding with the ending of the Israeli military Operation 
Grapes of Wrath in 1996.  Jaber’s factual account details multiple Lebanese perspectives 
on the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon, reasons for resistance, and support for 
                                                 
19 Christopher M. Blanc Thehard and Jeremy M. Sharp, “Lebanon,” CRS Report for Congress (June 
12, 2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33509.pdf. 
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(and against) Hezbollah.  The author argues at the end of this book that Hezbollah 
appears to be moving towards a more moderate political position and will continue to 
assimilate into the political arena.  A major hindrance to assisting or speeding this 
transition is the branding of Hezbollah, by Western nations, as a stereotypical terrorist 
organization.  “So long as the West and Israel continue to regard the problem as a crusade 
against terrorism they are in effect denying their own responsibility for fostering the 
conditions which gave rise to Hezbollah.”20 
Mohammed Ayoob gives a fairly balanced reason for why Hezbollah developed 
and became a Shi’a institution.21 He details a parallel, historical example between Hamas 
and Hezbollah showing them to be two groups who have resistance to a foreign occupier 
as their primary reason for existence.  Ayoob argues for Hezbollah’s individuality as a 
group that is not solely interested in sowing the seeds of local or transnational terrorism.  
He concludes that Hezbollah’s goals are very local in nature and have a clear strategic-
political objective. 
They [Hizbullah22 and Hamas] are national resistance movements 
whose primary aim has been to end foreign occupation of their 
lands…They are political parties that participate in national politics 
with the aim of influencing their countries; domestic and foreign 
policies… In the process they have turned increasingly pragmatic… 
leading one to believe that they are well on their way to becoming 
“normal” political parties.23 
Ayoob’s dialogue leaves no argument as to whether or not he is proud of 
Hezbollah’s violent past.  According to Ayoob, all roads lead back to the Israeli 
occupation and as such any violent act that can be justified in light of the occupation is 
sanctioned. 
Eitan Azani has written one of the most thorough books about Hezbollah to date.  
The author’s main point is that “the Hezbollah movement is a product of the environment 
                                                 
20 Hala Jabar, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1997), 
214.   
21 Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World, 213.   
22 Hizbollah and Hezbollah will also be used throughout this text depending on the quoted author’s 
usage.   
23 Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World, 129.   
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in which it operates and of the interactions and the reciprocal relations between the 
players surrounding it.”24  Azani’s management of the text leads the reader to believe that 
Hezbollah is an international corporation and its leader(s) are executive businessmen 
calculating the expansion of their ‘corporation’ just like a Fortune 500 company.  This 
line of thought is highlighted by the comment that “the movement used a controlled 
policy that integrated guerilla warfare and terrorist attacks while taking into account 
‘profit and loss’ considerations.”25  Finally, with a distant respect, the author expresses to 
the reader Hezbollah’s keen social awareness, political prowess, and demonstrated 
military capability.     
Judith Harik’s book, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, is a policy-
focused book that revolves around Hezbollah.  In it, she delves into a historically based 
account of Hezbollah’s formation with a summation of U.S. policy reaction towards the 
group in a pre and post-9/11 world.  Harik emphasizes the political motivations of the 
Bush Administration with regard to branding Hezbollah a terrorist organization, and the 
ramifications that label ultimately has on furthering U.S. foreign policy goals in Lebanon, 
as well as the hindrance it places on possibly aiding Hezbollah’s assimilation into 
mainstream Lebanese politics.  The book also explores the links between the Asad regime 
of Syria (and Iran) and its control/support for Hezbollah.  Harik unabashedly labels U.S. 
interest in the region as hypocritical.  She supports this accusation by the repeated policy 
of branding Hezbollah a terrorist organization on the one hand, and the seemingly passive 
acquiescence to any and all aggressive Israeli policies toward Lebanon.26 
Finally, Naim Qassem, the Deputy Secretary General of Hezbollah, in Hizbullah: 
The Story From Within, gives a completely firsthand account.  Obviously biased and 
outright supportive of Hezbollah, it does offer insight into the group’s philosophy as well 
as an intimate perspective of someone on the receiving end of U.S. and Israeli policy 
                                                 
24 Eitan Azani, Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 
241. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Judith P. Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (New York: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 
2007), 201.   
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sanctions.  A telling passage illustrates his attitudes well with regard to the on-again, off-
again offers of U.S. Congressmen to meet with Hezbollah. 
United States hostility has manifested itself through words and 
actions alike…[An] encounter between the Party and the United 
States administration will not add anything new to the acquaintance 
of each side with the other’s views and would not alter the stance on 
either side. 27  
In other words, both organizations know exactly what the other believes and 
neither of them will change the other’s mind, so why talk.  There is and will continue to 
be hostility amongst both parties.  It is a useful insight into seeing this group through 
their own eyes and offers excellent perspective into how they perceive the diametrically 
different offerings of the U.S. administrations (sticks) and their regional neighbors (Syria 
and Iran-carrots).    
3. Drugs 
The literature on drug trafficking is almost universal in its assertion that the 
current policies are doing more harm than good.  Prohibition, just like when it was 
enacted to combat the “evils” of alcohol, had the exact opposite effect policy makers 
assumed it would have: increased demand, an accommodating supply system, and a profit 
margin that pulled entrepreneurs into the market.  
Douglas Valentine paints a compelling mosaic of the United States government’s 
attempt to stop international drug trafficking before it entered U.S. borders as well as the 
initial agency tasked with sending the fight outside of the United States, the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics (FBN).  Valentine argues that, “federal drug law enforcement is 
essentially a function of national security… in its broadest sense: not just defending 
America from its foreign enemies, but preserving its traditional values… while expanding 
its economic and military influence abroad.”28  In The Strength of the Wolf, he weaves 
together the political, bureaucratic, and national-security problems that accompany any 
attempt to halt the leviathan that is international drug trafficking.  Valentine conveys to 
                                                 
27 Nasim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within, trans., Dalia Khalil (London: Saqi, 2005), 249.   
28  Douglas Valentine, The Strength of the Wolf: The Secret History of America’s War on Drugs (New 
York, NY: Verso, 2006), 3. 
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his reader that even though a problem like drugs may appear to be a simple one to solve 
(simply eradicate them), numerous factors influence the ability to bring about such 
eradication.  For example, FBN agents, while working abroad, often ran into investigative 
roadblocks put in place by other agencies (CIA and FBI), and FBN executives were often 
subordinated to spies, politicians and influential drug traffickers.   
The bottom line is any and all attempts to combat the influence of illegal 
substances throughout the globe has been half-hearted at best because politicians have 
discovered that the war on drugs could be exploited for promotional purposes, the 
appetite for drugs is immense and the money to be gained is too great to ignore.29        
A plethora of historical documents chronicles FBN agents’ interaction with 
narcotics traffickers in Lebanon through the 1950s.  These FBN documents lay out the 
players, the areas of cultivation, and the points of entry into the country and points of 
departure out of the country.  The leading players in the Lebanese drug business were 
“influential politicians”, the area of importance was the Bekaa Valley, and the urban 
focus of drug trafficking was Beirut.30 Most importantly, the coupling of politicians with 
drug dealers became so prevalent through Lebanon’s history that those individuals were 
really one and the same.  The drug trade became a source of immense income to very 
powerful people.  It became a part of the political landscape to the point that FBN 
operations could not commence against certain individuals due to their political standing 
and their connections.  A direct result of this relationship was the rule that ‘He who 
controls the drugs, controls Lebanese politics.’   
Lebanon’s geographical importance to the drug trade at least through the 1950s 
cannot be understated and becomes clear reading through FBN agent reports.  The 
laissez-faire attitude documented by the agents was expressed by senior political leaders 
down to the nameless merchant sweeping the sidewalk on some nameless Beirut street.  
As a matter of record, Charles Siragusa, an FBN agent stationed in Beirut clearly stated 
                                                 
29  Douglas Valentine, Strength of the Wolf, 9. 
30  “Charles Siragusa to Mr. H. J. Anslinger, September 16, 1950. “Subject Files of the Bureau of 
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, 1916–1970, Records of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Record 
Group 170, National Archives Building II, Silver Springs, MD. 
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in correspondence to the Commissioner of Narcotics, Mr. H.J. Anslinger that “traffic in 
hasheesh, opium, and cocaine are widespread in Beirut.”31 
Drugs, Oil, and War is a fascinating book about the nexus of these three issues.  
Peter Scott, utilizing the examples of Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina, explains the 
‘necessary’ alliances made with drug trafficking proxies that facilitate indirect 
intervention in Third World countries and how such a relationship always has negative 
long-term consequences.  According to the author, “the result has been a staggering 
increase in the global drug traffic and the mafias assorted with it.”32   The premise put 
forth by Scott is that the problem of terrorism the United States faces today is partly 
rooted in the historical context of previous U.S. policy decisions with respect to both 
drugs and oil.  Recognizing the intermeshing of these three flammable issues and the 
failure of previous policy, the author advocates the rejuvenation of U.S. “soft power”33 to 
deal with these complex issues. 
Alfred McCoy, a professor of history at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and 
author, probes the conjuncture of illicit narcotics and covert operations over half a 
century in The Politics of Heroin.  McCoy believes, like Peter Scott, and the data 
supports the theory that “prohibition has contributed to the growth of drug trafficking as 
one of the world’s largest industries.  In the 1990s, the United Nations reported that the 
global drug traffic is a $400 billion industry with 180 million users…”34 McCoy 
identifies Lebanon, specifically the port of Beirut, as a way station for substantial 
shipments of opium and its derivatives from places like Iran and Turkey.  Although the 
author’s major focus is on Southeast Asia, the fact that the market for narcotics is 
international required the author to address the trafficking routes throughout the globe. 
                                                 
31 “Charles Siragusa to Mr. H. J. Anslinger,  September 16, 1950. “Subject Files of the Bureau of 
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, 1916–1970, Records of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Record 
Group 170, National Archives Building II, Silver Springs, MD. 
32 Peter Scott, Drugs, Oil, And War (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), xi.   
33 An ability to shape the preferences of others that tends to be associated with intangible power 
resources such as an attractive culture, ideology, and institutions (Joseph Nye).   
34 Alfred McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade (Chicago, IL: 
Lawrence Hill Books, 2003), 22. 
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D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The country of Lebanon has never been able to transcend sectarian loyalties in 
order to achieve the desired nationalistic Lebanese identity.  The primary presupposition 
of the National Pact and the Ta’if Agreement are that those who dwell within its borders 
have given up their primary identity for a nationally unified identity.  Although the 
sectarian groups that occupy Lebanese land do not agree on much, it appears as if there is 
something that a majority of the confessional groups can agree upon—drug trafficking 
can facilitate the means by which to garner more power and control.    
I have attempted to utilize source materials that support the idea that the political-
criminal connection plays a more prominent role in society than many would choose to 
believe.  Books written by recognized experts on Lebanon, its history and its politics 
often glance over this important connection because it is not the intention of the author to 
address the causes of Lebanon’s ills, merely to address the sickness.  These references 
support my argument and have provided me with a working knowledge of Lebanese 
history  
I have also used a number of newspaper articles (the New York Times mostly) 
that helped in two ways: first and foremost they provided a sense of how Lebanon was 
perceived and defined; and secondly, they chronicled drug activity.  It is understood that 
although newspaper articles are submitted for editing, they do not receive the same 
amount of peer scrutiny prior to publishing and will not include equivalent in-depth 
analysis as does an academic work.  There is merit in their use, however, in that they 
provide another perspective on the subjects of Lebanon, politics and drugs.     
Peer reviewed scholarly articles predominated the source list utilized for this 
thesis.  Occasional opinion/editorial pieces in regional newspapers were used when 
possible.  These by their very title, “opinion/editorial”, promote one side of an issue over 
another.  However, because individuals that have lived in the region or are currently 
living there offer the opinions, these must be considered opinions that have been 
influenced by the social undercurrent of Lebanon, not by casual observers from afar.   
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Several national and international reports (Congressional Research Reports 
produced over the last decade, United Nations reports on Transnational Crime and 
Terrorism, European Union policy documents, Open Source reporting/events and United 
States Policy documents with respect to the Global War on Terror) were also used.  It 
must be considered that these documents may have been written with a particular 
political bent.  In other words, their findings may have been pre-determined based on 
political motivations.  This is a very conspiratorial position, but cannot be ruled out.  That 
being said, they were all extremely helpful in expressing the immense influence narcotics 
trafficking has throughout not only the United States, but also the world.  
National archives of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics were used to document first 
hand interaction between narcotics officers and traffickers within Lebanon during the 
1950s.  Direct correspondence between Lebanese based agents and their supervisors, 
field reports and bureau records during this period provided a substantial paper trail of 
evidence for this thesis.  
A glaring shortfall is the total lack of any non-English resources.  My inability to 
speak or understand any language other than English restricted the breadth of research 
material I could pull from.  My lingual restrictions result in an incomplete picture of the 
region.  The use of Arabic or French resources would have been extremely helpful.    
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis aims to chronicle the volatile history that Lebanon has experienced 
since its founding in 1926, establish a picture of a fractured political system paralyzed by 
confessionalism, and explain how drug trafficking shaped the politics of Lebanon and 
contributed to the development of Hezbollah. Why is a study such as this warranted?  
There are no countries that the business of drug trafficking does not touch.  It is a cancer 
that negatively impacts the social fiber of all nations.  It brings in a net profit equal to that 
of oil production and because of that seduces many.  Understanding who and what enable 
drug trafficking in Lebanon, and who profits from it, will provide analysts with a clearer 
picture of those who exercise influence within Lebanon.      
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The systemic analysis provided in this thesis will demonstrate that no matter the 
geographic location, the factors involved in the drug trafficking equation are the same.  
There are enablers, profiteers, and consumers.  The line between these individuals is 
often blurred, allowing for involvement in multiple aspects of drug trafficking.  The 
enablers in Lebanon are many.  They are the farmers working the land to make a living 
wage, the local politician that turns a corrupt head or the local police that refuse to 
enforce the law. The profiteers are the large-scale landowners, the central government 
officials, and confessional group leaders. The consumers are the most egregious factor in 
this equation, for as long as there is a market for illicit drugs there will be an individual 
willing to provide them.  Consumers will not however be addressed extensively in this 
work.       
My job, interests and passions have turned my attention to the Levant region and 
Lebanon in particular.  I consider it my responsibility as a citizen to speak out against the 
social ills I observe no matter where my gaze shall fall.  So, I am taking this thesis as an 
opportunity to highlight what I consider to be a greater contributing factor to Lebanese 
socio-economic problems than has previously been attributed.  Many of the authors 
quoted in this book address worthy topics of interest—Shi’a in Lebanon, the 1975 Civil 
War, Ottoman involvement in the Levant - and I don’t wish to take anything away from 
their topics of interest.  However, I believe drug trafficking is an issue that intertwines 
with many of the topics previously mentioned. 
Chapter I will provide the introduction and foundation for follow-on chapters.     
Chapter II will address the history surrounding the Lebanese nation.  It will 
highlight the involvement that imperial and regional powers have had in Lebanon, the 
beginnings of sectarian conflict upon Mount Lebanon, and how sectarian tensions have 
been at the heart of all civil conflicts within Lebanon.  Critical analysis of Lebanon’s 
history, including understanding who controls economic interests like drug trafficking, 
will lead to factors that contributed to a fractured political system, rank with political 
corruption and nepotism. 
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Chapter III attempts to tackle the complex organization known as Hezbollah; how 
and why it began.  The chapter will address the factors that contributed to the Shi’a 
awakening, specifically the blatant abandonment by the central government with respect 
to physical security, social welfare programs and infrastructure development.  It will 
chronicle Hezbollah’s genesis from a strident nationalist resistance offshoot of Amal, 
unhappy with participation in a corrupt political system.  Chapter III will lay out the 
factors that contributed to Hezbollah’s reliance on militancy to solve the political and 
security problems that threatened the Shi’a of Lebanon. It will also touch on the factors 
that contributed to Hezbollah’s unprecedented rise to political prominence.  Lastly, 
Chapter III will begin to connect drug trafficking, sectarianism and Hezbollah.    
Chapter IV speaks to the big picture problem of drug trafficking within and 
throughout Lebanon beginning in the 1950s, those people involved in its perpetuation, the 
U.S. Federal Bureau of Narcotics’ attempt to affect drug trafficking within the United 
States by attacking the problem at overseas origins such as Lebanon, and the role of 
sectarianism as it relates to drug trafficking.     
Finally, Chapter V will draw conclusions based upon analysis in the preceding 
chapters and decisively show that drug trafficking has had a greater influence on the 
political landscape of Lebanon than previously considered.  It will show that the 
complexity of the Lebanese political environment was, and continues to be, supported by 
involvement in illegal drug trafficking, and that it was rampant across all confessional 
groups.  All of these groups (Sunni, Shi’a and Christian) had their hand in the proverbial 
narcotics cookie jar; but it is Hezbollah who now controls the cookie jar, adding to its 
coffers through illicit drug trafficking.     
My conclusions are simple.  First, drug trafficking contributed to the Lebanese 
political landscape seen today to a greater extent than has previously been acknowledged.  
The elite of all confessional groups have controlled all aspects of the economic system 
within Lebanon since its inception, and the illicit drug trade throughout its borders is no 
exception.  Second, profits from drug dealing within Lebanon most certainly contributed 
to the nepotism, corruption and political advancement of many individuals involved in 
Lebanese politics.  This heavy-handed manipulation of political and economic systems 
 19 
within Lebanon established a system within which Hezbollah eventually took control and 
utilized to solidify its control over southern Lebanon and finance their military activities.  
Unless a systemic problem-solving approach to social ills such as drug trafficking 
is taken, these problems will never be solved.  In other words, drug trafficking cannot be 
eradicated simply by going after drug traffickers.  The first step to take towards that end 
is to identify the interconnectedness of everything—the role of politics, social welfare, 
citizens’ needs and demands, etc. 
Lastly, the socio-political advantage provided by drug trade involvement, central 
government abandonment, and military oppression has all contributed to the development 
of Hezbollah.     
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II. LEBANON: THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST 
To Beirut… 
From the souls of her people she makes wine, From their sweat, she makes 
bread and jasmine. So how did it come to taste of smoke and fire? 
–The Lebanese singer, Fayrouz35 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Lebanon is a meeting place of East and West, a place where the solidly defined 
boundaries of religious ideology meet opportunism.  This is not to say that religious piety 
is the goal of its entire citizenry, but an un-crossable line of personal and group 
identification invoked to further political and economic interests.  Lebanon lies at the 
crossroads of the great land and sea routes that link Europe, Asia and Africa.  “[It] 
benefitted from trade in times of peace and, as part of the principal invasion routes, 
suffered in times of war.”36  Lebanon’s society has traditionally been known as “liberal 
and tolerant, traditional rather than zealous or fanatical in its attitude towards religion and 
political ideology.”37  Point of fact, this makes it no different from many other Middle 
Eastern countries.  Unfortunately, religious ideology is too often the identified reason 
analysts provide as an explanation for violence when they fail to look at a problem 
through a systemic lens.  In other words, the complexity of Lebanon’s difficult history 
has often been lost in dramatically simplistic news headlines – Sunni vs. Shia, Maronite 
vs. Druze, ‘Religious’ conflict in the Middle East, etc.  There is more to Lebanon’s 
history than battles fought in defense of religious ideology.  Confessionalism and the 
delicate political environment it creates, competing economic interests, and internal 
meddling by regional and European powers have all contributed to its colored history.  
The focus of this chapter is the intersection of these political, religious and economic 
interests.   
                                                 
35 Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon (New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing, 
1990), 92. 
36 Sandra Mackey, Lebanon: Death of a Nation (New York, NY: Doubleday Publishing, 1989), 19.   
37 Kamai Salibi, A House of Many Mansions (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), 1. 
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An assumption made in this chapter (and expounded upon in later chapters) is that 
drug trafficking has been a greater enabler of Lebanese social structure than previously 
considered.  However, it is important to understand Lebanon’s history before considering 
the systemic involvement of drug trafficking.  This chapter will chronicle a historical 
foundation built by competing ethnic, religious, political and economic differences.  
Some important questions to be considered are:  What laid the foundation for strict social 
identification? How did the major confessional groups establish their positions in 
Lebanese politics?  How did confessionalism (sometimes referred to as sectarianism) 
affect the political landscape? Where does each group fit into the social framework of 
Lebanon?  And how did the political landscape shape the politics of Hezbollah?  
Students of the Middle East understand that Lebanon is a land of constant 
volatility.  The Romans, the Islamic Caliphates, the Ottomans and most recently 
European powers all played a role in the shaping of what would become Lebanon.  In 
other words, Lebanon has only recently become an independent nation, free from overt 
manipulation of its domestic affairs by external powers.  
B. PRE-IMPERIALISM 
The seed of confessionalism in Lebanon can be traced as far back as the soldier-
slave kings known as Mamluks.  These usurping rulers defined Pre-Ottoman power and 
identity from their seat of power in Egypt.  The land they ruled extended into the region 
known as Greater Syria, which included Lebanon, from the end of the thirteenth century 
for the best part of 300 years.  The Mamluk Empire was established on the back of 
military prowess, however that skill soon became secondary to social affiliation.  Based 
mainly on the traditional oral histories of individual families, the Mamluk period... 
saw the expansion of the Sunni community in the coastal cities and 
of the Druze lords in the mountains as far north as the Matn 
district; the Shiites remained dominant in the Kisrawan and began 
to move into Christian dominated district in the fifteenth century, 
before being driven out of the Kisrawan by the Maronite 
recolonization push in the seventeenth century.38  
                                                 
38 Stefan Winter, The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1788 (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 63. 
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The self-segregation that resulted in the region over time eventually played out to 
the Mamluk rulers’ advantage.  It has been inferred that “the Mamluks were clearly 
aware of the unique challenges they faced... but pursued no demographic policy as such, 
preferring, like the Ottoman authorities after them, to turn the inherent conflicts and 
divisions within its highly segmented society to their advantage.39  Eventually, greater 
importance was assigned to ethnic affiliation, which contributed to increased conflict in 
the region and the gradual weakening of the Mamluk lords.  Confessional conflicts were 
not the sole reason for the Mamluks’ defeat, but regrettably a problem that would plague 
the region for years to come.   
Ottoman soldiers captured Mount Lebanon and its surrounding area in 1516 
AD.40  They ended the Mamluk dynasty with the taking of Cairo in 1517.41  The location 
of the center of power may have changed when the Ottomans defeated the Mamluks, but 
religion and ethnicity remained crucial markers of difference in the Ottoman system.  
They defined communal boundaries and relationship with the seat of power.  A concerted 
effort to control the urban centers with little regard for rural issues became a defining 
characteristic of the Ottomans (and those that followed).  The Ottomans kept a rather 
loose reign on Greater Syria (land that included modern day Lebanon) for the first three 
centuries of their rule, choosing to concentrate their control in the main cities where their 
governor and garrisons were located and often leaving the hinterland to itself.  Local 
elites eventually derived their power from their role as intermediaries between the 
Ottomans and the urban population, which the notables could speak for and control.42  
Beginning with Fakhr al-Din al-Manni, the founder and chief lordly supporter of 
Ottoman advance into the region in 1516,43 elites began to capitalize on their exclusive 
relationship with the Ottoman government that was solidified when the Ottomans 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 64. 
40 Helena Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 35. 
41 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 2009), 34. 
42 Sandra Mackey, Lebanon: Death of a Nation (New York, NY: Doubleday Publishing, 1989), 70 and 
109. 
43 Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 37. 
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bestowed upon him and his successors the title of ‘Amir’ (commander or prince).  
According to Cobban, “The ‘autonomy of the local rulers’ was important for the 
emergence of an inter-sectarian system in the Mountain, [and] the various different lords 
were tied into a single system, by the maintenance of a single lordly family at its head.”44  
The succession of mountain princes, through political skill and maneuvering, maintained 
control of Mount Lebanon for nearly two centuries between the sixteenth and eighteenth 
century.  Although the Manni dynasty eventually ended in 1697, the idea of privileged 
governing families continued between the major sects of the Mountain. 
Without venturing too deep into Lebanese sectarian groups, it is important to 
provide a general survey of the sectarian make-up of the land and how they interacted.  
An initial glimpse at the sectarian make-up of the land of Lebanon may cause one to 
believe that there are merely Christians and Muslims present.  However, these two groups 
are further divided into sub-groups that would take great offense if they were insensately 
labeled exclusively as Christian or Muslim.  These sub-groups include Shi’ite and Sunni 
Muslims, Druze, Maronite Christian, Greek Orthodox, Armenian, Greek Catholic and a 
small group of others.45  Their peoples came to the region during empire expansion 
campaigns and Crusades, in pursuit of economic gain and in search of religious freedom.  
The social interaction between the various communities was limited to economic and 
commercial exchanges.  This ‘separateness’ resulted in each community developing 
independent social systems, with its own beliefs and values, communal consciousness, 
specific interests, and stratification system.  Moreover, each community was virtually 
self-contained geographically: the Druzes and Maronites lived in their enclosure on 
Mount Lebanon, the Shiites in southern Lebanon and the Beq’a Valley, the Sunnis in the 
coastal cities and towns, and the Orthodox Christians in parts of North Lebanon and the 
city of Beirut.46   
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The identification of confessional groups and their role is so important that Soffer 
suggests, “The key to understanding Lebanon’s frequent crises and its fragile existence is 
its confessional or sectarian structure.”47 
Ottoman rule over the region was interrupted for nearly a decade when in 1831 
the army of Muhammad Ali Pasha, led by his son Ibrahim Pasha, invaded Syria and 
routed the Ottoman forces within.  The Christians, not happy with the current power 
dynamic and claiming that the ruling Druze community “enjoyed a privileged position in 
the system”48, initially welcomed the change of rulers.  However, Muhammad Ali’s 
autocratic governance, propensity for centralization and economic deterioration of the 
country eventually led to dissent.49  European powers supported dissention while 
protecting and expanding their economic interests in the region.  In fact, ”the Egyptian 
invasion of Greater Syria triggered a European response that reveals the intricate linkage 
between the actions of local Middle Eastern rulers and Europe’s determination to defend 
its interests in the area.”50  The Ottomans eventually gained back control of the region 
and by 1839 began to undertake implementation of Tanzimat reforms.   
The Tanzimat was meant to embody the principles of legitimacy and liberty in the 
person of the Sultan, who as a ‘legitimate’ ruler decreed the religious equality of all his 
subjects.  The Ottoman decrees within Lebanon during the Tanzimat period, while 
attempting to enhance civil liberties and grant equality, were ineffective; this was an 
example of grassroots reality taking precedence over political intentions.  Makdisi 
recognized this and asked a simple question followed by a profound statement, “What 
about regions like Mount Lebanon where the Sultan was absent and where liberty and 
legitimacy were open to fundamentally incompatible interpretations?  Ottoman reformers 
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obviously did not take into account the demographic character of Mount Lebanon.”51  
Demographic make-up of the region was not lost on European powers that “needed 
[distinct] local communities to justify their involvement in the Ottoman Empire.”52  
Maronites and other Christians, encouraged by European backers, expanded their 
commercial ventures, established educational institutions and “generally asserted 
themselves in a manner that the Druze and Sunnis saw as overstepping the bounds of 
what was permitted to ‘minority’ subjects in a Muslim state.”53  Fundamental 
interpretation differences of the Tanzimat decree, led to a manifestation of violence in 
1841 between Christians and Druzes.  An official separation of the two warring parties 
was eventually imposed using a geographically recognized line of demarcation, the 
Beirut-Damascus road.  This European designed and Ottoman enforced separation, 
known as the double qa’immaqamiyya (district presidency), marked a more pronounced 
role Western Europeans would play in Lebanese affairs, for it was designed by the 
renowned Austrian Chancellor, Prince Metternich.54   
The “struggle over land and control of taxation, provided the impetus for inter-
communal tensions” and “marked a redefinition of the relationship between religion and 
politics”55 within a multi-religious society.   It was also only the beginning embers of 
“smoldering Muslim resentment over this change in the accepted social and political 
order”56 that manifested itself in sectarian massacres and full-blown civil war through the 
middle of 1860.  The conflict between the two confessional groups left the mountain 
scarred, and constituted a turning point in modern Lebanese history.  Hundreds of 
villages had been destroyed and thousands of lives were senselessly lost.  Leila Fawaz, 
quoting Abkarius, writes that the conflict between Druze and Maronite got so bad that 
“when the news of the massacres in the Lebanon reached the ears of [his] Majesty the 
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Sultan Abd al-Majid Khan, it gave great pain to his Majesty and compassion for his 
subjects took hold of him” to the point the sultan shed “abundant” and “sincere tears.”57 
European powers pressed the Ottomans to quell the violence, resulting in dispatch 
of their Foreign Minister to Beirut and implementation of radical reform to the 
qa’immaqamiyya formula.  A commission “representing Britain, France, Russia, Austria 
and Prussia, with the Ottoman minister in the Chair, convened to find a political 
settlement for Lebanon.”58  By 1861 a new regime for Mount Lebanon was designated to 
operate under the guarantee of the five deliberating powers plus Italy.  “The regime, still 
nominally part of the Ottoman Empire, would be called the mutasarrifiyya, or provincial 
governorship.”59  The turbulence that plagued Lebanon since 1820 appeared to have 
ended, creative energies focused more on productive fields than political factionalism and 
Mount Lebanon began to gain a widespread reputation as the “best governed, the most 
prosperous, peaceful and contented country in the Near East.”60.  But perhaps this was a 
picture disseminated by the European and Ottoman powers who desired a return to more 
peaceful times.   
This period, according to Weiss, was an “important watershed in the emergence 
of institutionalized sectarianism in Lebanon”61, for the rift between the Maronite and 
Druze communities was firmly established and violence towards other confessional 
groups an acceptable course of action.  Makdisi captures the true environment of post-
1860 violence when he uses a descriptive of the indigenous writers as being 
“overwhelmed by the urgency of proximity”, for to them “the war of 1860 was not 
simply a tribal problem that haunted the periphery of imperial or colonial concern, as it 
appeared to European and Ottoman officials, but rather a calamity that devastated local 
society, uprooted thousands, and left a legacy of mutual acrimony and fear both within 
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and, especially, between communities.”62  During this time of extraordinary 
transformation, violence became a tool of change and European involvement within the 
region more intrusive. 
C. EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM 
Lebanon experienced a lull in sectarian conflict between 1861 and 1914.  The 
factions that occupied its lands had learned to live in relative peace until the Ottoman 
Empire and the mutasarrifiyya dissolved with the outbreak of World War I.  It was the 
1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain, France, and Russia that carved up the 
Ottoman Empire following its defeat and firmly established a constant European presence 
in the region.  As part of the agreement, Britain won effective control over the area of 
Palestine, and France over the area that is now Lebanon and Syria.  With the stroke of a 
pen, the provinces of Greater Syria were handed from one master to the next, from distant 
rulers (Ottomans) content on remaining detached as long as the required duty was paid to 
an imposing European power (France) bent on shaping Greater Syria for its gain.63     
The French claim to Syria was based on a combination of religious, economic, 
and strategic interests.  France professed a “moral duty to continue its long-standing 
religious and educational activities in support of the Christian communities in the 
Levant—especially the Catholic Maronites of Mount Lebanon.”64  The Christians 
understood that they would maintain a position of ensured comfort as long as the French 
were in control of the region.  Therefore, it was in their best interest to further the 
interests of the French.  France secured its mandate over its share of the ‘Levant’ 
territory, ousted King Faysal from Damascus, and proclaimed the creation of Greater 
Lebanon in order to begin the reorganization of the area in 1920.65  A religious 
justification for French interference most certainly intensified the growing alienation felt 
by the Muslim communities.  Ironically, the Shi’a ‘benefitted’ from the French mandate 
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and creation of Greater Lebanon because for once they were legally recognized as a 
separate community.  Legal recognition did not come with any other benefits and as such 
the Shi’a would remain the most disenfranchised group within the country for many years 
to come.  Social change for the rurally located Shi’a may have remained relatively 
stagnant but the upward mobility of many Christians and Sunni in the cities developed at 
a rapid pace and had reverberating effects.  
Change began most often away from the Mountain.  People were moving into the 
cities and the traditional idea of power began to subtly change.  Beirut became an 
important port with respect to transit trade.  The blossoming middle class was beginning 
to flex its muscle and demonstrate its differences from the rural landscape.   No longer 
was power focused solely in an individual because he was born into a historically 
powerful family.  Lebanon entered into a time when economic power led to political 
power that must be balanced with inherited power.   
Powers previously exercised on the local level were moved into a national venue 
by the French.  The establishment of the legislature—the idea that officials would 
represent an entire population, not just their recognized religious organization—was a 
positive contribution made by the French and an idea that challenged the traditional 
‘za’im’ role.  Albert Hourani believed “this principle might indeed be regarded as the 
most important contribution made by the French to the political life of Lebanon.”66  Also, 
the economic prosperity of the cities began to show as the political skeleton of Lebanon 
started to take shape.  There is no doubt, according to Georges Hakim, “the upper class of 
rich landowners and capitalists [exercised] considerable influence in Lebanese economic 
and political life.”67   
It is also suggested by Hakim that much of the economic influence utilized by 
these capitalists resulted from what he calls “invisible receipts”.  This revenue comes 
mainly from services rendered to foreigners in the fields of tourism, banking and trade, 
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particularly transit and re-export trade.  Other ‘invisible’ income consists of emigrant 
remittances and foreign companies’ operating expenses.68  Mackey suggests that a 
portion of the ‘invisible receipts’ mentioned by Hakim were a result of participation in 
the narcotics trade.  She states that because Lebanon was a nation of meager natural 
resources and almost no industry, “it sustained itself on “invisible income.  This revenue 
was derived from banking, transit trade, various forms of brokerage, remittances...and a 
healthy slice of smuggling and drug dealing.”69  Charles Issawi supports this idea by 
providing a description of the dark side of economic development in Lebanon in the 
following manner: 
Lebanon being Lebanon, there has been a proliferation of nightclubs, 
casinos, and other ‘abodes of wickedness,’ as well as a certain amount of 
smuggling into neighboring countries.70 
It goes without saying that when change brings with it economic fortune, that 
some of that fortune will be acquired through less than honorable means.  This idea will 
be explored in greater depth in future chapters.  
D.  GENESIS OF A NATION 
Michael Hudson dutifully described the genesis of Lebanon akin to being “born 
schizophrenic.”71  The documents that proved to be an unsteady foundation upon which 
the Lebanese political house was built contributed to its dreadful condition.  They are 
mentioned now because instead of defining an environment of equality and merit, they 
contributed to the insidious confessionalism still seen today.   
Lebanon has two foundational documents: a constitution and the National Pact.  
The Lebanese constitution of 1926 adopted the communitarian form of government used 
by the French for so many years to maintain power—ensuring the existence of a volatile 
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political mix in which competition for power would be based on sectarian affiliations;72 
however, it was the 1943 National Pact that truly defined the path of communitarianism 
and sectarian violence.  The “close and dynamic collaboration between the Maronite 
president Bishara al-Khuri and the Sunni Prime Minister Riyad al-Sulh”73 modernized 
the centuries-old struggle for power among religious communities into a conflict over 
political and economic power.  
The French legacy, manifested in the establishment of the legislature, was 
conceived in the drafting of the Lebanese constitution.  Scholars may argue over the 
extent of French influence in drafting this pivotal document but there is no argument in 
the statement that “[its] importance laid in its confirmation of the existence of a Lebanese 
entity separate from Syria and its consecration of the existence of ‘Greater Lebanon.’74  
The constitution stressed freedom and equality, although with some limitations.  All 
Lebanese were guaranteed the freedoms of speech, assembly, and association within the 
limits established by law.  There were provisions for the free exercise of all forms of 
worship, as long as the dignity of the several religions and the public order were not 
affected.75  “The constitution provided for a single chamber of deputies that was elected 
on the basis of religious representation, a principle that had been accepted during the 
period of the mutasarrifiyyah.  The precise formula for determining this representation 
was specified in the National Pact of 1943.”76  
Whereas the Lebanese constitution was an actual document of record establishing 
Lebanon, the National Pact was merely a verbal agreement between Christian (al-Khuri) 
and Sunni Muslim (al-Salhl) leaders. “Basically, the Pact provided that the Christians 
would recognize Lebanon as an Arab state which would coordinate its policies with its 
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sister Arab states, as a result of which they could be assured of the allegiance and support 
of the Moslem communities to an independent Lebanon.”77  It defined the limits of 
equality penned in the Lebanese constitution and protected the confessional groups by 
ensuring an agreed upon ratio of 6:5 Christian to Muslim representation within the 
legislative body.  This ratio was based on a census taken in 1932, taken to justify the 
creation of Lebanon’s government along sectarian lines and firmly establish the privilege 
of the Christian elite over Lebanon’s Muslim and Druze populations.  In practice, key 
positions of power were clearly reserved based on sectarian group: the country’s 
president would be a Maronite; its premier a Sunni Muslim; the Speaker of the House a 
Shi’ite Muslim.78  The National Pact moved the country closer to defining a Lebanese 
identity; however at the cost of cementing the Christians/Muslims division and alienating 
the other sectarian groups.   
Sectarian, ideological and economic fissures began to manifest themselves 
following independence in 1943 (although the last French left in 1946).  Internally, the 
government was dominated by elites who demonstrated little interest in improving the 
lives of most Lebanese.  Powerful political parties (Kata’ib/Phalange=Christian, 
Jumblats=Druze) began to form along with regional and sectarian associated militias.  
Well into the 1950s disparities were evident everywhere.  Christians were 
overrepresented in the government.  Literacy rates among Christians were twice that in 
other communities and rural infrastructure development lagged far behind the rapidly 
expanding urban areas.  Externally, a succession of coups d’etat in Syria, Iraq and Egypt 
brought to these countries a new generation of leaders genuinely committed to Arab 
Nationalism and the Palestinian cause.  Also, the 1948 establishment of Israel and the 
resulting Palestinian refugee problem served only to exacerbate inter-communal tensions 
in Lebanon.  Regional dynamics during this period exposed the country’s vulnerable 
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sociopolitical structure to external pressure like never before.79  It was only a matter of 
time before the artificial barriers that defined and separated each sectarian group 
collapsed under internal and external pressures.  
The mini civil war of 1958 was a point at which the pressures weighing on 
Lebanon reached the boiling point.  The eruption was “to the point where it threatened 
the very integrity of the state, of that most basic, most existential, of Lebanon’s internal 
conflicts, between its predominantly Christian, Westward-looking self and its 
predominantly Muslim, Eastward-looking one.”80  Camille Chamoun, the Maronite 
president, stood in blatant opposition to Nasser and his vision of Arab unity and 
economic equality.  In the eyes of many nationalists, Chamoun was in the same league as 
a pro-Zionist.  Instead of seeking a middle ground with the incredibly popular Nasser, 
Chamoun sought refuge in Western assurances—specifically from Lebanon’s historic 
protector France.  Conflict began to erupt as the country began to tilt more towards its 
Western-looking self.  Muslim and Druze took up arms following electoral tampering, 
eventually controlling most of the countryside.  By the summer of 1958, 2500 people had 
lost their lives and the Greater Lebanon of 1920 appeared ready to collapse.  Western 
powers, moved by extenuating circumstances, eventually entered Lebanon, replaced 
Chamoun and restored confessional order.81   
E.  STATE WITHIN A STATE – THE PALESTINE ISSUE 
“Hostilities between Arabs and Jews broke out shortly after the end of the British 
mandate in Palestine (1948) resulting in several hundred thousand Palestinian Arabs 
arriving in Lebanon, Syria and the Gaza strip.”82  Within Lebanon, they settled mainly in 
the Muslim enclave in Southern Lebanon, in the Sour and Nabatiyeh districts and avoided 
mixing with the Lebanese Christian community, forming the basis for poor relations in 
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later years. 83  Unfortunately, the majority of refugees were unskilled laborers unable to 
transition into the professional strata of Lebanese society.  They were farmers that had 
lost their land, fated to fill in as cheap unskilled labor and relegated to the many refugee 
camps established and run by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).  
These bidonvilles, or slums, quickly became synonymous with Palestinian deprivation. 84   
Although a majority of Palestinian refugees were Sunni Muslim and they could 
have proved to be a potent political ally for Lebanese Sunnis, they were initially seen as 
an economic threat by both Christian and Muslim alike.  In fact, “the zuama huddled and 
decided to impose stern limitations on the Palestinians”85, even going so far as labeling 
them ‘non-nationals’, which barred them from any government employment.   
It wasn’t until 1964, at the first two Arab summit meetings called by Nasser did 
the Arab heads of state agree, under Egyptian pressure, that a ‘Palestine Liberation 
Organisation’ (PLO) should be created and would have political responsibility for the 
rights of the Palestine Arabs.86  This organization, of course, originally meant nothing 
more than “a docile body of well-behaved notables” easily controlled by the other Arab 
regimes.87  Its first Secretary General, Ahmad Shukairi, believed the PLO should focus 
its attention on the corrupt Arab monarchies in Jordan and Saudi Arabia.  His misguided 
leadership and perceived passivity among Palestinians led to the empowerment of more 
militant organizations such as al-Fatah, headed by Yasir Arafat.  The PLO eventually 
morphed into an “umbrella organization under whose authority several different, and 
often fractious, resistance groups coexisted”88 that launched raids across the border into 
Israel.   Palestinian militancy inside Lebanon also sharpened the debate between those 
Lebanese who supported the Palestinian military presence in Lebanon and those who 
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opposed it.89  The Maronites had expressed their reservations about the Palestinian 
movement from the beginning.  The Palestinian issue cut to the very heart of the 
Lebanese political system and pressurized Lebanon beyond what it could endure.  In fact, 
Mackey unabashedly states, “It was the Palestinians who would become the catalyst for 
civil war among the Lebanese, fatally split by religion, frozen in a political system 
bequeathed by a European colonial power, and embittered by economic inequalities and 
regional disparities.”90 
The PLO did not act independently, but were enabled by a regional actor with 
selfish interests.  “In fact, the considerable Syrian backing helped the PLO in Lebanon to 
become an important military and political factor which presented a potential challenge to 
the weak Lebanese government, thus contributing to the outbreak of civil war in 1975.”91 
The Syrians had a vested interest in keeping a buffer between them and the emboldened 
Jewish state to their south.  The Syrian government encouraged and enabled the 
strengthening of the Palestinian ‘state-within-a-state’ and therefore condemned Lebanon.  
Lebanon was metaphorically offered up by Syria as a sacrificial lamb, an area of land in 
which to fight Israel without actually fighting Israel. 
Lebanon and its people were eventually forced to endure hardships resulting from 
PLO attacks into Israel.  The confessional group most dramatically affected by militant 
Palestinians, an aggressive Israel, and a meddling Syria was the Shi’a.  Expecting relief 
from a PLO that had become aggressive towards its host and a weak central government 
that allowed such behavior, the Shi’a initially welcomed an Israeli presence in southern 
Lebanon.  But, just like the Egyptian rulers that replaced the Ottomans, the Shi’a of 
Lebanon merely exchanged one taskmaster for another.  The Israeli soldiers did not seem 
to differentiate between Shi’a, Sunni, or Palestinian.  There was no difference between 
Muslims in the minds of Israeli soldiers on the Lebanese streets; a Muslim was a Muslim.  
The displacement and destruction the Shi’a endured at the hands of Israeli soldiers was 
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the straw that broke the proverbial Shi’as back.  Years of negligence at the hands of the 
Lebanese government, disrespect from Palestinian guests, and the blatant disregard of 
basic human rights by Israeli soldiers pushed many to find protection through unity as the 
other confessional groups had in the past.   
Israeli incursions into Lebanon were meant to destroy an identified enemy (PLO) 
that had become a nuisance to Israel and a parasite on Lebanon.  Unfortunately, because 
of Israel’s blatant disregard for the situation in which Lebanon’s people found 
themselves, they ended up creating a second enemy—Shi’a militants which eventually 
evolved into Hezbollah.  This organization is specifically mentioned because of its 
conflictual relationship with the United States and Israel.  It is not the only organization 
within Lebanon that would consider itself an ‘enemy’ of the two Satans, but it is one that 
has had a strategic impact on American political and military policy.  It is my argument 
that drug trafficking indirectly influenced the development of Hezbollah and directly 
empowers it now. Future chapters will attempt to tie all of these arguments together.       
The first noticeable cry from the Shi’a people was made by Imam Musa al-Sadr, 
the founder of Amal (Movement of Hope).  Al-Sadr worked tirelessly to mobilize the 
Shi’a community.  He traveled the country reminding villages of Shi’a holidays and the 
pride associated with Shi’a history.92  Slowly a sense of community and political 
awareness began to develop.  Al-Sadr was disgusted by the blatant disregard the 
Lebanese government showed towards the Shi’a, but he knew that in order to affect real 
reform he would need the help of other influential sectarian leaders.  Al-Sadr’s efforts 
were gargantuan but would be no match for the turmoil that was slowly coming to a boil 
all around Lebanon.  An aggressive PLO, a weak central government and sectarian 
groups not willing to sit passively by and watch a growing conflict consume them soon 
challenged Al-Sadr’s vision for Amal.  A group of young Shi’a men had been awakened 
by the civil conflict around them and chose a more aggressive path towards Shi’a 
recognition – militant resistance backed by religious ideology.  
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“The schism in Lebanese society between those who detested the Palestinian 
presence in Lebanon and those who supported it imposed itself on the longstanding, 
unresolved issues that had divided the Lebanese since independence: Lebanon’s identity, 
its position in the Levant, and the extent of its ‘Arab’ obligations.”93  Lebanon began 
careening toward civil war at the beginning of the new decade.  In 1970, the newly 
elected Christian president, Suleiman Franjieh, a man claiming to be a direct descendant 
of a Crusader, took office after ‘winning’ by one vote.  The president’s first act was to 
order a confessionally divided army to crack down on the Palestinian militias.  The 
Muslim refusal to act on this order opened the door for the Phalange, the Maronite 
militia, to fill the void.94   Lines were quickly galvanizing that, once crossed, would 
result in senseless annihilation for many years to come.  
F. CIVIL WAR (1975–1990) 
The fateful year of 1975 began with a classic dispute between Christian and 
Muslim.  The Maronite leader and malefactor of 1958, Chamille Chamoun, after being 
granted extensive fishing rights lay claim to the fish off Sidon for his protein supplement 
company.  Muslim fishermen, who dominated the fishing industry, strenuously objected 
to this government sanctioned and economically damaging power grab.  Muslim political 
factions supported the fishermen by marching through the streets of Sidon and protesting 
against the government.  Marouf Saad, Sidon’s mayor, while marching became the victim 
of an unknown assailant shot dead from a gunshot.  His death turned the protests into 
riots that lasted for several days.  The military was unwisely brought in to put down this 
confessionally charged disagreement.  “The Sidon fishing dispute escalated into a 
showdown between all the forces of the right (Maronites) and the left (Sunnis, Druze & 
Shiites), between Christian and Muslim, that had simmered in Lebanon for decades.”95          
The resulting civil war only required a single act of political violence to transform 
the political tinderbox of Lebanon into a fire-scorched landscape.  On Sunday April 13, 
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1975, unidentified gunmen killed four members of the Kata’ib (Phalange) Party in front 
of a Maronite church where Pierre Gemayal was attending mass, whereupon Kata’ib 
militia ambushed a busload of Palestinians returning from work and murdered all its 
passengers.96  The PLO and its Jumblattist supporters responded and the domino effect of 
violence began.  Greek Catholic towns in the Beqaa Valley became locked into clashes 
with some of its Shi’ite and Palestinian neighbors.  Kata’ib militias fought Jumblatt 
militias across the country while an impotent Lebanese military stood by and watched.  
Political party leaders resigned their posts in protest and President Frangieh struggled to 
maintain a working government.  “By September 1975...Ideology began to vanish in a 
maelstrom of base and petty interests.  The Maronite militias killed one another for 
control of the port of Beirut and the profits it engendered.  They fought each other for a 
percentage of the hashish trade...”97  
The security situation in Lebanon took a turn for the worse in October 1975.  
Violence from the countryside spilled into Beirut.  It became a geometrically divided city 
with each sectarian militia holding defensive lines around their respective neighborhoods, 
while at the same time conducting offensive operations against other groups.  The 
situation continued to deteriorate as the year drew to a close.  “Throughout November 
and early December, the fighting continued… it hardly even paused to mark the arrival of 
reconciliation missions from such longstanding allies of Lebanon as France and the 
Vatican.”98  Kata’ib Party leader Pierre Gemayyel, in an attempt to gain an advantageous 
ally, headed to Damascus to ask for Syrian support on December 6, 1975.  That same 
day, Kata’ib militia members were rounding up and killing any Muslim workers within 
western Beirut in retaliation for the murdering of four Kata’ib members.  “On that single 
‘Black Saturday’, no fewer than seventy Muslims—and probably more—were killed 
purely on the basis of the mandatory line in their ID cards denoting ‘religious 
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affiliation’.”99  The Muslim/leftists to the spilled blood of sectarian members were crying 
out for vengeance and perpetuated the cycle of violence.   
Throughout 1975 and into early 1976 Syria’s public stance on the violence 
perpetuated in Lebanon was one of peace negotiation and mediation.  This does not 
negate the fact that even before the outbreak of war, Syria was providing “substantial 
quantities of arms to radical Palestinian guerilla organizations, which were transferred in 
part to the militant Lebanese groups.”100  The first sign of Syria’s potential frustration at 
the violence across their border was manifested in January 1976.  Syrian forces were 
moved to the Lebanese border “as a warning to Lebanese president Franjieh and 
Phalangist leader Pierre Gemayel that Syria would intervene to prevent a Maronite 
victory.”101  No group maintained an upper hand militarily for too long so when the 
battle rhythm shifted in favor of the PLO and its supporters (LNM Joint Forces), Asad 
changed positions and concluded that such a victory would be a threat to Syrian strategic 
interests.   
Syrian forces crossed the Lebanese border at the end of May 1976 in order to 
impose order in the capital. They did not however engage in full-scale combat with 
Maronite forces, but with PLO and LNM Joint Forces in the mountain passes leading to 
Beirut.  By October 1976 the Syrian army had defeated the PLO-Lebanese leftist alliance 
and assumed control of large parts of Lebanon.102  Syrian military intervention ended the 
first phase of the civil war but it did not end the Lebanese crisis.  Lebanon was not lost, 
but it could not be restored or transformed.  Power had been transferred “from traditional 
politicians and factions to new groups fielding their own militias.”103  The Syrian regime 
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would remain an intricate part of Lebanese domestic affairs for decades to come, 
ensuring that these new ‘leaders’ attended to Syria’s interests. 
Lebanese factional representatives and others deeply interested in the civil war 
met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in mid-October 1976 to attempt to reach agreement on a 
lasting ceasefire.  It was agreed that the Palestinians could remain in Lebanon as long as 
all combatants returned to the positions they held prior to April 1975.  The other main 
issue, and one Syria was most interested in for it was accorded a dominant role in it, was 
the creation of a formal Arab Deterrent Force (ADF).  Of note, a ‘secret’ clause between 
Syria and the PLO was inserted in the agreement that stated the “’Arafat Trail’, the illicit 
supply route from Syria into southern Lebanon, would be reopened by Syrian troops to 
allow Palestinian units to move south to counter growing Israeli influence in the border 
area.”104  
An agreement may have been reached on paper between religious party 
representatives, a Syrian presence may have brought a momentary calm, and many may 
have thought the fighting was soon to end, but that was not the case.  Aggressive 
Palestinian action continued to be projected outwards into Israel and resumed against 
Christian and Muslim Shi’a alike.  The impotent Lebanese government was no match for 
a well-armed, well-disciplined Palestinian force so Israel, like Syria had, threatened to 
intervene if Palestinians were permitted to increase in strength on the Israeli border.  
Starting in mid-1976, that intervention took two major forms: military support to 
Maronite militias fighting in and around the Lebanese capital and the introduction of the 
‘open fence’ policy.105  Israel’s ‘open fence’ policy was a campaign to win the hearts and 
minds of Southern Lebanese Christians and Shi’a Muslims.  They “were allowed into 
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‘Good Fence’ policy rapidly paid dividends for the Israelis in the form of homegrown 
Maronite militias—all armed by Israel—and located along the southern border of 
Lebanon.107   
The nation of Lebanon was stuck in the middle of a Syrian-Israeli struggle that 
would be played out on neither country’s own land.  Syria was forced to be content with 
the land they already occupied and not push past the ‘Red Line’ Israel had drawn, 
running inland from a point on the coast about midway between Sidon and Tyre.     
When one studies Lebanese history it quickly becomes apparent that it is a 
patchwork of violence connected by interim periods of calm.  In March 1977, the tense 
peace that had settled over the country was shattered when “Kamal Jumblatt and two 
bodyguards wound through the twisting roads southeast of Beirut into a blazing ambush.  
The enigmatic Druze leader died instantly.”108  His followers filled the streets with 
shouts of revenge and the blood of over 100 Christian souls over the next several days, 
even though none doubted the guilt rested on Hafiz Asad.109  Eventually, another peace 
agreement was made—Shtaura agreement—but never implemented because none of the 
parties involved (the Syrian government, the PLO and the Lebanese government) were 
willing to make the first move towards disarmament. 
“Between 1977 and 1982, a sullen three-way stalemate existed among the 
Christians, grouped behind the Lebanese Forces and armed by Israel; the alliance of the 
left, the remnants of the National Movement reinforced by the PLO; and Syria.”110  
Almost a year to the date of Jumlatt’s murder, in March 1978 the Palestinian guerrilla 
group, Fateh, demonstrated their continued intentions to conduct surgical strikes into 
Israel.  In the early morning hours of March 11, eight Fateh commandos infiltrated into 
northern Israel and hijacked a bus to Tel Aviv.  The final carnage left thirty-one Israelis 
and six guerrillas dead.  Retribution came swiftly on March 14 when Israeli military 
forces launched the ‘Litani Operation’ and swept into Lebanon, bombarding the bases 
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and supply routes used by the PLO and their allies.111  Lebanon would be in a holding 
pattern of retaliatory actions for the next couple of years after that incident. 
The PLO’s belligerent attitude towards its host, specifically the Shi’a of southern 
Lebanon, and its constant forays into Israeli territory once again ignited the embers of a 
conflict whose flames seemed destined never to die down.  On June 6, 1982, “fifteen 
years, almost to the day, after its greatest triumph, the Six-Day War—the Israeli army 
embarked on what its well-known historian, Martin van Creveld, called its ‘greatest 
folly’”112—‘Operation Peace in Galilee’, the brain child of Ariel Sharon, Israel’s defense 
minister.  Sharon’s intention was to succeed where other Israeli defense ministers had 
failed.  He schemed, not only to grind the PLO in Lebanon to dust, but also to ensure its 
destruction by changing the political structure of Lebanon.  Unfortunately, all he 
succeeded in doing is planting the seed of Zionist hatred in the hearts of all those that 
suffered during this invasion.  I believe few would argue that during the succession of 
Israeli strikes, the “disproportionate force” used by Israel in order to “liquidate the PLO” 
resulted in the forced expulsion of one enemy from Lebanon (PLO) and the creation of 
another—Hezbollah (the topic of the next chapter).  
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 could be described as successful if one 
defined success solely as the expulsion of the PLO.  Unfortunately, nothing occurs in a 
vacuum and the sectarian violence that was perpetrated during the Israeli advancement 
scarred the confessional relations for many years to come.  Groups inflicted wanton acts 
of terror against their sectarian enemies under the auspices of righting past wrongs.  The 
following passage encapsulates the sectarian hatred that was present in the lungs of 
Lebanese militiamen by 1982.   
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One Israeli soldier atop his tank, peering down on the carnage that 
was once the Palestinian and Shiite neighborhood of Sabra and the 
camp of Shatila, demanded of a Phalangist why his people were 
killing women and children.  The militiaman shouted back, 
“Women give birth to children, and children grow up into 
terrorists.”113   
 
The carnage of 1982 was not reserved for the Lebanese alone.  The PLO were on 
their way out, but the enemy that replaced them proved to be far more lethal.  
Fundamentalist Islam had supplanted nationalism as the great new credo and popularly 
mobilizing force resulting in Lebanese warrior-Muslims with an agenda, allegiances and 
support that transcended Lebanon.114  The length to which a specific Islamic militant 
group (Hezbollah) was willing to go in 1982 was evident when two hundred and forty 
Marines and Sailors were killed by a devastating truck-bomb.  Thus began the undeclared 
war between the United States of America and Lebanese Hezbollah.  
Intra-confessional conflict quickly became as frequent as inter-confessional 
battles, as groups began to fight over the ‘spoils’ of war (economic and political power).  
Unfortunately, by 1985 the economy had hit a wall.  “The cumulative effects of the years 
of destruction, the progressive erosion of the country’s social fabric, and a deeply 
ingrained sense of despair settled on the economy.  A dead economy and high inflation 
followed.  The only growth industry in war-ravaged Lebanon was the illicit drug 
trade.”115  Militias from all sides participated in one of the few lucrative means to make 
money.  In short, everything that had enriched pre-war Lebanon was destroyed or beyond 
repair. 
By 1989, there appeared to be some inclination toward conflict resolution 
between those that supported the status quo (the Lebanese Front and the Christian 
establishment) and the revisionists (Lebanese National Movement, the Muslim 
establishment, and the Palestinian resistance movement).  The basic issues in dispute 
between the two groups were mediated by a high profile and authoritative Arab League 
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committee that put forth proposals which were eventually approved by the Lebanese 
parliament in October 1989.  The Taif Accord “allowed communal pluralism to maintain 
its legitimacy... It restored to the political system its structural options... And the accord 
established a framework for continuing and formalizing the resolution process that might, 
if properly implemented, lead to political integration and social harmony over a period of 
a generation or two.”116  
The Taif Accord never accomplished what its supporters wished it would because 
it perpetuated the Lebanese problem—not all confessional groups benefitted equally from 
it.  According to Abraham, “the Shi’ite and Druze communities were left out in the cold 
and had very little to gain from the Taif Accord.  From their perspective, the agreement 
was concluded by their enemies, the Maronites and the Sunnites.”117  Devastating battles 
ensued because of its attempted implementation.  
G.  CONCLUSION – THE MEEK INHERITED NOTHING 
Lebanon, “as an amalgam of religious communities and their myriad sub-
divisions, with a constitutional and political order to match, is the sectarian state par 
excellence.”118  Painted with the prejudice of external economic interests, Lebanon “has 
been presented... as a homeland for the area’s Christians but by the 1980’s this was 
clearly no longer the truth.  It was equally the homeland of its Shiite, Druze, Sunni and 
other communities—each with their own rich vision of the country’s purpose.”119  The 
individual visions for the country and confessional desire for power at the expense of 
other groups led to political disenfranchisement, economic inequality and incessant 
religious conflict.  Although considerable blame rests on external interference for 
Lebanon’s predicament, “the deficiencies of the political power-sharing arrangement and  
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its inability to regulate elite discord [and greed] as well as meet the needs of a 
modernizing country experiencing the forces of social mobilization”120 must be 
considered.   
Lebanon’s complex social environment possesses both vertical (within 
confessional groups) and horizontal (among confessional groups) divisions, which on 
occasion attempted to pull the society apart and threatened the delicate balance of power.  
Rather than being a source of enrichment, variety, and vitality, they have generated large 
residues of paranoia and hostility sustained by ‘ideologies of enmity,’ i.e., the affiliative 
idealizing of one’s group and the aggressive denigrating of another.121   Understanding 
the relationships (socioeconomic, political, and religious) between competing sectarian 
factions is crucial to understanding the outcomes of confessional conflict, such as the 
ascendancy of the Shiites and the eventual empowerment of Hezbollah.  Moreover, 
understanding confessional or sectarian politics in Lebanon, each group’s multi-faceted 
agendas, and economic interests is crucial to understanding the context of how the drug 
trade shapes Lebanese politics.  
The militant Shi’ite resistance group, otherwise known as Hezbollah, the topic of 
the next chapter, quickly realized at the end of the civil war that “in Lebanon, the meek 
inherited nothing”122, and in “the new reality power came from a gun.”123 The social and 
political landscape was about to change yet again.    
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III. DRUGS IN LEBANON 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Lebanon has been shaped by multiple factors that included colonialism, conflict 
and corruption.  The previous chapter discussed the development of the national 
resistance group turned political party Hezbollah at the nexus of these factors.  Beneath 
the undercurrent of conflict that has defined Lebanese history, one issue has always been 
present to one degree or another—narcotics trafficking.  The monetary benefit of drug 
trafficking provides substantial economic and political capital for any individual/group 
that chooses to participate in this dangerous illicit activity, which is why nearly all of the 
major confessional groups have been involved with it at one time or another.  I contend 
the drug trade has been overlooked as an important contributor to the political landscape 
of Lebanon, directly by enriching those confessional parties that control it and indirectly 
by contributing to a nepotistic and corrupt socioeconomic system that gave rise to 
Hezbollah. The focus of this chapter is a strategic analysis of drug trafficking throughout 
Lebanon, what relationship drugs had/have with the confessional groups of Lebanon, and 
how/why the United States became involved in counter-narcotic operations in a 
seemingly inconsequential country.   
Although drugs (hashish and opium in particular) have been a part of the 
Lebanese landscape since before its independence, they have never been thoroughly 
addressed as contributing factors to the Lebanese political scene.  A natural question to 
arise is, ‘How could drugs contribute to the shaping of the political scene?’.  Whoever 
controls the drugs, controls an extremely lucrative commodity.  The monetary freedoms 
that drug trafficking provides, enriches those already in a position of economic advantage 
and allows one to unduly influence those already possessing political power.  
Drugs are commodities that also provide a wage for their cultivator not 
comparable through legitimate agriculture, an enriching investment for the local 
strongmen (zaims or abada), and an exaggerated rate of return for those seeking or 
holding political power.  Michael Johnson, a fellow at the Centre for Lebanese Studies, 
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Oxford supported this argument matter-of-factly in his book Class and Client in Beirut 
when he stated, “the warlords of Lebanon ran the hashish and heroin export trade… and 
various other rackets”124. It was also the warlords that decided who were to represent 
their area of influence politically.  So, whether directly or indirectly, narcotics have had 
an influence on Lebanese politics. 
In order to appreciate the impact of drug trafficking within Lebanon it is 
important to take a step back to see the global picture of drug trafficking, how the 
international community began to rally around the ‘prohibition’ cause, and what 
eventually led to U.S. involvement in Lebanon with respect to drug trafficking.  This 
paper is not meant to be a history lesson on drug trafficking around the globe.  But it is 
sensible to at least discuss how substances that began as a “bad habit or vice in 1809, was 
later described as a disease of addiction in 1909 and then [became] something else in 
2009.”125  
Beginning in an era of morally tainted racism and colonial trade wars, 
prohibition-based drug control grew to international proportions at the insistence of the 
United States.  America and the colonial powers were confronted with the effects of drug 
addiction and abuse at home, and it was decided that a focused attempt to stem the flow 
of drugs into their territories from the sources was the best means by which to fight it.  In 
doing so, they earned political capital back home and shifted the cost and burden of drug 
control to the drug producing countries with no cultural inclination or resources to take 
on such an intrusive task—and no economic or military power to refuse what was 
imposed on them.  An unforeseen and unfortunate side effect of the Western control 
advocates’ prohibition focus (vice addressing demand simultaneously) was the 
development of the global illicit drug trade.  
It could be argued that the first modern example of ‘global’ drug trafficking began 
with the Opium Wars (1839–1842 and 1856–1860). The English arrived in China in 1637 
and eventually established an economic foothold when “the British East India Trading 
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Company was allowed to open a trading station in Canton in 1715”126, marketing among 
other items opium from India.  By 1729, rising opium use in China prompted an imperial 
edict that forbade the sale of opium for smoking purposes and in 1799, another edict 
prohibited importation.127  The British East India Company, realizing the grave economic 
impact such a proclamation would have on its profits, pressured the British government 
to intervene.  After the Second Opium War, China yielded to British pressure and once 
again allowed the importation of opium. 
Nearly fifty years (Sept 20, 1906) after restrictions against the use of opium were 
removed, The Peking Gazette published a royal decree denouncing the “poison that 
practically permeated the whole of China.”128  The Chinese Government Council laid the 
foundations once again for a prohibitionist environment by stating, “within a period of 
ten years the evils arising from foreign and native opium be equally and completely 
eradicated.”129  After much discussion British and Chinese governments on January 27, 
1908 accepted the ‘Ten Year Agreement’.  According to the agreement, Great Britain 
would decrease the exportation of Indian opium by one-tenth.130  It is inconsequential the 
amount of opium decreased with respect to this paper because the opium continued to 
make its way into China.  What is important is that governments began to associate social 
problems with ‘drugs’ and to vilify these commodities that had previously been traded in 
the same manner as wheat or tobacco.   
At the 1909 Shanghai Conference, the International Opium Commission131 met, 
but because none of the representatives possessed the necessary diplomatic authority to 
negotiate a treaty the end result was nothing more than fact finding and non-binding 
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recommendations.  It did however set the stage for future negotiations and agreements 
lobbied for aggressively by the United States.  In the words of William McAllister, 
“addressing the opium problem directly, publicly and internationally was a way for the 
U.S. to achieve its domestic control objectives, to put an end to the profitable drug trade 
dominated by the colonial powers, and to curry favor with the Chinese and thereby 
hopefully improve Sino-American economic relations.”132  The U.S. lobbying eventually 
led to the 1912 Hague International Opium Convention and several years later, an 
agreement signed in Geneva concerning suppression of the manufacture of, internal trade 
in and use of prepared opium.  The significance of these conventions is twofold: (a) 
narcotics control was established as an institution of international law on a multilateral 
basis; and (b) the framework for the national narcotics control regime had begun.133 
The end of the 1920s is when U.S. policy with respect to international drug 
trafficking began to solidify into an agency that would be the United States’ first line of 
defense against an ever-encroaching illicit drug market.  William B. McAllister 
succinctly contextualized the worsening international drug problem at the end of the 
1920s and the need for such an agency:   
In addition to continued overproduction of opium inside China, statistical 
returns indicated that Chinese imports of manufactured drugs had 
skyrocketed. The European colonial powers continued to tolerate (and 
profit from) opium smoking through government monopolies.  As western 
European governments pressured pharmaceutical companies to conform to 
more stringent control standards, unscrupulous operators moved to states 
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Traffickers became more sophisticated in their operations, colluding with 
political and/or military brokers to avoid prosecution. Drug abusers and 
their suppliers acted as inventively as the diplomats and bureaucrats; those 
wishing to circumvent the system altered their routes of acquisition to fit 
the new pattern.134  
A large portion of the materials used to analyze the topic of drugs in Lebanon and 
their relationship to political position is found in formerly classified Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics (FBN) documents.  These firsthand accounts from agents in Lebanon paint a 
picture of economic interest supported by political muscle.  The drug crops were planted 
instead of food crops because they would yield a greater profit—a revenue commodity by 
landowners, farmers, and traffickers.  To be honest, crop choice can be boiled down to 
simple math.  If Farmer K can earn $25/bushel for wheat but $250/bushel for hashish, 
why wouldn’t he choose the higher profit?  It is too unfortunate that over time, the most 
productive region of Lebanon went from being the breadbasket of Rome to the money 
basket of confessional leaders and interfering regional powers.     
B. FEDERAL BUREAU OF NARCOTICS 
The premier American agency investigating international drug trafficking 
beginning in the 1930s was the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), led by Harry 
Anslinger from 1930–1962.  The premise behind the Bureau’s modus operandi was 
stopping drugs at their source before they entered the United States.  Their mission 
proved to be a gargantuan task the FBN was not adequately manned to successfully 
accomplish.  This did not mean however, that the FBN agents sent abroad did not attempt 
to stall the tidal wave of drugs heading towards the United States with gusto.   
One of the identified source nations for hashish and opium trafficking by the 
1940s was Lebanon.  Lebanon’s countryside, particularly the Bekaa Valley, was an 
agricultural wonderland rich with fertile ground for any crop cultivation.  Wheat and 
barley crops that used to feed empires were abandoned in favor of more profitable crops.  
Unfortunately, the crop choice for many farmers was hashish since it yielded the highest 
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profit.  Lebanon’s urban areas were not exempt from drugs’ influence.  Its capital city, 
Beirut, was like any major American city—a concentration of people, business, and 
government with appetites for making a profit and the feeling drugs provide.  
Charlie Siragusa, working mainly out of Italy and the FBN’s first overseas office, 
ran much of the investigation into drug trafficking within Lebanon.  FBN agents working 
in Lebanon were like journalists, businessmen, and tightrope artists rolled into one.   
They developed contacts with traffickers, made purchases and passed on pertinent 
information to the Italy office for further analysis or possible arrests within Europe.  An 
agent’s greatest weapons were the informant networks built through interaction with local 
businessmen/dealers and a strong working relationship with local police.  In Lebanon, 
arrests were not possible due to the high-level personnel connected to the drug trade.  
Investigations could not end in arrests because of the known collaboration between drug 
traffickers and politicians, so Lebanon became a springboard for investigations and 
arrests in other destination countries along the drug routes, including the United States.    
Drug trafficking was a well-established part of the Lebanese economy by the time 
Charlie Siragusa decided to officially open an FBN office in Beirut in 1954.  The Italian 
Mafia’s decision to reroute most of the illicit heroin traffic to Beirut following the Italian 
government’s crackdown on heroin made this a wise decision.  Lebanon was increasing 
in importance to the international drug trafficking community due to the ingrained 
corruption among politicians and police that facilitated the drug flow into and through 
Lebanon.  In fact, the operating environment was tense and fragile due to the potential for 
political backlash from parliament members involved in hashish cultivation—most 
notably members of the Maronite Christian minority and its paramilitary action arm, the 
Phalange.135  Siragusa had to balance the effect of FBN operations on internal Lebanese 
politics, and operate within restrictions placed on him and his staff by U.S. agencies such 
as the CIA and the State Department.  Lebanon was a tricky environment that required 
street smarts, cultural awareness, and a keen sense of survival.  
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No one knew these requirements more than Paul Knight, the first agent in charge 
of the Beirut office during the period 1954 thru 1961.  During his tenure, it was known 
that he was an American Embassy employee, in the Agency for International 
Development’s Office of Public Safety, which provided material aid to the Lebanese 
police forces.   But Lebanese security also knew that CIA officers were working under 
the same Safety Program, and thus Knight had to keep some distance from the Embassy.  
Relationship building did not come easy because he held a personal passport, not a 
diplomatic one, and he lived in the St. George Hotel, posing as a travel agent.  Living 
under multiple identities caused some concern for Lebanese officials because they were 
not entirely sure he could be trusted.   
Paul Knight’s initial contact was an influential figure, Lebanon’s national security 
chief Emir Faoud Chehab.  Chehab was tainted by his family’s involvement in corruption 
during the French mandate, and therefore he could not help Knight build narcotics cases.  
Knight struck gold however when he was introduced to Hannah Yazbek, a Maronite 
strongman and an individual capable of introducing Knight to potential informers as well 
as providing intelligence on local narcotics traffickers.  Knight explained the social 
layout of Lebanon clearly when he said,  “They had a system in Beirut not unlike that in 
Chicago, in which the city was divided into ethnic and religious neighborhoods.  Each 
neighborhood had a strongman, the abada, from whom criminals and businessmen alike 
bought protection.  Hannah Yazbek was the Maronite abada.  He was a hashish smuggler 
connected to the Gemayel family, which controlled the Fascist Phalange and collaborated 
with the Vichy French.  And he was essential to getting the job done.”136  Through 
Hannah Yazbek, aka Abu George, Knight was able to develop the picture of drug 
smuggling operations in Beirut and the nearby Bekaa Valley, “the ancient Biblical land 
between Syria and Lebanon where hashish was grown and narcotics were smuggled.”137 
The Federal Bureau of Narcotics branch within Lebanon was critical to support of 
the Bureau’s primary mission—stopping narcotics trafficking at its source instead of after 
it gets into the United States.  Although arrests were not directly made by FBN agents, 
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the networks developed by the agents contributed information that led to arrests in other 
countries along the narcotic routes to the United States.  Their work provided an 
understanding of drug trafficking within and through Lebanon during the tenuous period 
shortly after its ‘independence’.  The magnitude of drug trafficking within Lebanon, its 
pervasiveness among all confessional groups, and economic influence is evident upon 
examination of FPN documents.  
C. DRUGS IN LEBANON (1944–1948) 
Lebanon was a country of great socio-economic potential in the 1940s.138  It’s 
place within the world capitalist system was firmly established by the end of the Ottoman 
Empire through silk and agricultural food exports.  Local markets were brimming with 
products imported from Europe and major industrial countries were investing massive 
capital.139  The economy was booming in all sectors, including the drug trade that was in 
full swing by 1944.  The Bekaa Valley was awash with hemp farms and Beirut port was a 
hub of narcotics trafficking.  However, local leaders felt pressured to take a strong public 
stance against drugs because of the international pressure that was being exerted by the 
United States and its allies. 
Lebanese leaders publicly opposed drug trafficking.  Religious scholars called 
drug trafficking an offense against Allah and the secular government saw hashish 
production as a threat to society.  Both groups of leaders responded to this social problem 
by issuing public statements denouncing participation in drug trafficking.  Prominent 
sheikhs Ahmed Jarbou and Ali Hannaoui issued a fatwa that clearly stated, “It is to be 
regretted that hashish plantations exist in Jebel Druze… the Prophet has denounced 
[it]…God has forbidden it in His book…any land planted with Indian Hemp is cursed… 
All those who continue to grow Indian Hemp will be banned and excommunicated.”140  
Also, a government communiqué, issued March 29, 1944, reminded farmers and 
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landowners that hashish production was strictly forbidden and the government would 
take drastic steps to destroy all hashish plantations.141  These proclamations did not have 
the effect hoped for by their writers.  Hashish production increased, causing the 
government to take measures to eradicate its production.  The communiqué, the fatwa 
and foreign government prompting essentially kicked off the 1944 ‘Hashish 
Campaign’—a superficial war on drugs waged by the Lebanese and Syrian governments 
in order to convince the United States that they considered drug trafficking a serious 
international issue.  
D. THE 1944 HASHISH “CAMPAIGN” 
Lebanon was considered both a thoroughfare for drugs and a major cultivator of 
them by 1944.  As a result, the Lebanese government was experiencing increased 
pressure to enforce their anti-drug laws from states directly impacted by narcotics 
trafficking.  The 1944 Hashish Campaign was the first attempt to suppress hashish 
production by a fledgling Lebanese government.  Previous years’ campaigns (1942–
1943) had been run by the Surete Generale aux Armees and the British Security Mission 
because Lebanon had been under the French mandate. By May of 1944, orders were sent 
out to all law enforcement posts to “prosecute the campaign with the utmost vigor.”142  
The campaign got underway punctually in Syria, but in Lebanon—owing to 
overwhelming demands on certain Gendarmerie districts—work did not begin until the 
end of July.  Despite the late start, the campaign was over by the end of August 
everywhere except for Jebel Druze where operations ended on September 8. 
Ironically, the 1944 hashish campaign was deemed successful.  Hashish 
cultivation was not entirely eradicated, but enough was destroyed it seems that the 
Lebanese and Syrian governments could applaud their efforts.  It should be noted that 
hashish production increased following the government’s eradication efforts.  According 
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to the local Beirut paper, Le Jour, August 16, 1947, “four and one half million square 
meters of land under hashish was raised in 1944 and four times that much in 1945.”143  
The government explained this increase by providing two possible reasons: 1) depletion 
in hashish stock due to the success of the 1942/43 campaigns and 2) maliciously fostered 
rumors that there would be no campaign in 1944 (particularly in the Bekaa Valley).  
Colonel sir Patrick Coghill, Chief of the British Security Mission, Syria and 
Lebanon, lauded the 1944 Campaign as “greatly satisfying” and “a matter of 
congratulations”144.  Any indication that the mission was unsuccessful was argued away.  
Coghill’s personal opinion of the Lebanese attitude towards the campaign is very 
interesting.  He believed “the attitude of certain of the Lebanese Ministers was a 
combination of lip-service to the Western ideas about drugs coupled with dismay at 
seeing a principal source of income destroyed.”145  It is unclear from the FBN 
correspondence report whether the ministers were referring to a loss of income to 
themselves or the farmers cultivating the hashish crop. 
E. DRUGS IN LEBANON (1949–1953) 
By the end of the 1940s, governments around the globe were cracking down more 
aggressively on criminal organizations involved in narcotics trafficking.  Due to the 
Italian government’s aggressive crackdown on Mafia activity during the early 1950s, “it 
was determined that most of the illicit traffic in heroin had been rerouted to Beirut” 
where individuals involved in its movement had strong connections to law enforcement 
officers and politicians, and were sending their product as far as New York City.146  It 
was becoming clear that movement of narcotics within and through Lebanon occurred 
with the full knowledge of individuals in positions of political influence.  Information 
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provided during this period also proves that any government attempts to curtail the 
supply of narcotics within or through Lebanon were unsuccessful, or rather lackadaisical.  
Trafficking of narcotics remained a lucrative business for those involved, including 
government officials.  
Evidence laid out in FBN correspondence plainly links high-ranking government 
officials to the drug trade.  A litmus test of Lebanese politicians’ involvement in narcotics 
trafficking was revealed by the extremely combative reaction to Lebanese Premier 
Abdullah Yafi’s decision in 1951 to send troops to destroy hashish crops in the northeast.  
The New York Times on July 2, 1951 reported, “Men who had occupied high office went 
livid with rage,” at the prospect of further government action against drug cultivation.147  
Why would a leadership decision to destroy an illegal substance evoke such an angry 
response from politicians, unless these politicians were in a position to lose a large 
portion of their income to the governmental crackdown?   
The best documented case of a politically associated individual dealing in drugs 
during this period provided by the FBN documents was Jean Choeary.  The FBN 
determined without question that an attaché associated with the Lebanese Legation in 
Paris, Jean Choeary, also known as Habib Khoury, was a known narcotics trafficker.148  
A delegate to the Vatican informed FBN Director, Henry J. Anslinger that Khoury was a 
Kavass (Turkish word meaning an interpreter-courier employed by Arab embassies) and 
also acted as a diplomatic courier, which made things easy for him to make frequent trips 
to Orly airfield in Paris, a well-known stop for drug trafficking.149  He also had 
“influence and solid support among top ranking policemen and politicians.”150 A FBN 
memorandum stated quite matter-of-factly that:  
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Khoury makes large deliveries of heroin and morphine bases…the 
narcotics are smuggled from Turkey to Beirut and then to Rome.  [He] has 
been smuggling morphine and heroin to France and Italyfor many 
months… It is believed he uses the diplomatic pouch for delivery… We 
believe that he was the source of supply for Akrom Yosef, a Lebanese 
student who was arrested in New York.151  
Khoury’s successful drug trafficking operations would not have been possible if he had 
not had a political network of support.   
F. SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT 
The issue of drug dealing diplomats brings up an interesting aspect of Lebanese 
history relevant to this topic—its relationship with regional neighbors and their 
involvement in drug trafficking through Lebanon.  The initial breakup of the Ottoman 
Empire had left Syria and Lebanon one governed area.  That of course was not to remain 
the case.  France and England quickly imposed imperially drawn borders that eventually 
led to two distinct countries.  Considering a shared history and the geographical 
proximity of Syria’s capital to the Lebanese border, it is easy to understand why Syria 
maintained a vested interest in Lebanese domestic issues until its ouster in 2005.  Also, 
the consistent instability within Lebanon posed a considerable risk of spillage into Syria 
and “provided strong incentive to intervene, in order to preempt any changes and direct 
them in ways favorable to itself.”152  
Syrian influence over Lebanese domestic affairs grew out of international concern 
over the Lebanese civil war (1975–1976).  Syrian President Asad took full advantage of 
the international community’s desire to provide stability to the Lebanese people and 
swiftly moved to inject Syrian influence throughout Lebanon.   For example, operating 
under the guise of trying to end the civil war, Hafiz al-Assad began sending Palestinian 
Liberation Army (PLA) troops under his control into Lebanon. The process was really 
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rather simple, “as Lebanese notables trooped to Damascus to confer with Assad, the 
Syrian-controlled PLA was patrolling Beirut and taking up positions in the Biqa.”153  The 
Syrian regime ‘considered control of the Bekaa and northern Lebanon essential for the 
maintenance of its influence in Lebanon’ because it provided a porous border through 
which to move East and a natural buffer to potential Israeli movements north.154  In 
summary, initial diplomatic efforts translated into the establishment of an expanded 
military foothold and enabled the Syrian government to unilaterally exercise influence 
over Lebanese domestic affairs, to include a controlling interest in narcotics cultivation 
and trafficking within the Bekaa Valley.  In fact, “the Assad-Franjieh (Lebanese 
President) relationship allowed the export of large amounts of hashish from the Biqa 
Valley”155 during the turbulent years that followed. 
A look at the volume of drug trafficking before and after Syrian occupation is 
enough to convince any skeptic that the affinity Syria had for Lebanon was stoked by its 
overwhelming need for the revenue that narcotic cultivation produced.  In 1975, prior to a 
full blown Syrian occupation, “Lebanon produced only about 100 tons of hashish per 
year.  By 1985 hashish production had increased twentyfold, to 2,000 tons a year.  In 
1986 Lebanese hashish accounted for 75 percent of world production.”156  Within a 
decade (1982–1992), the Syrians had taken advantage of the fertile Bekaa Valley by 
pushing cultivation to an unprecedented ninety percent of the land.  They also gradually 
transformed a large portion of the hashish fields with a more lucrative crop, opium that 
reaps more than ten times the price of hashish per acre.   
By the 1990s, Syrian military personnel, from junior officers to President Assad’s 
brother and the Minister of Defense, were reaping the harvest of narcotics trafficking 
within Lebanon.  In fact, “Syrian military units were bordering cannabis and opium fields  
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and laboratories for making heroin and individual Syrian officers were making as much 
as $30,000 a year from the trade.  All told, the Syrian military was getting a subsidy of 
$300 million to $1 billion from the heroin trade.”157   
Narcotics cultivation and trafficking through Lebanon may have blossomed into a 
billion dollar cash cow by the early 1990s.  But during the 1950s, before Syria had a 
sound foothold in Lebanon and was controlling much of the drug business in the Bekaa 
Valley, Syria needed to appear to support the American led, international anti-narcotics 
campaign.  A peculiarity about the ‘war on drugs’ is that it is characterized with lofty 
idealism and impossible goals.  Politicians, from Syria and Lebanon, knew this so they 
were able to swear with their right hands that they will do everything in their power to 
eliminate drug cultivation/trafficking within their borders and at the same time with their 
left hands pay someone to plow their hashish fields.       
In order to put on a show of repression to outside governments, the Syrian 
government was a very ‘willing and eager’ participant in the aforementioned “Hashish 
Campaign.”  Contrary to international perception, narcotics were flowing freely across 
the Syrian-Lebanese border while the campaign was executed.  Progress Report No. 31, a 
report sent from the Lebanese FBN agent to the director of narcotics, clearly states that in 
1950 “observations and previous information received by the Bureau indicated that there 
now existed the large-scale smuggling of crude opium from Turkey into Syria, eventually 
destined for foreign distribution from the port of Beirut.”158  In fact, it was already 
known to the Bureau that “rich landowners in the Jebel Druze area had been growing 
marihuana for many years now and these landowners appointed all local officials 
including the police.”159   
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Not surprisingly, Mr. Owen Jones, Charge d’Affaires of the American Legation, 
Damascus, Syria, shared that to the best of his knowledge “the Syrian government is not 
involved in the production of hasheesh.”160  The authenticity of such comments stands 
the test of time and highlights the fact that governments are often willing to overlook 
issues such as drug trafficking.  The truth on the ground highlighted by FBN agents in 
1950 Lebanon was apparently not a storyline the United States, Syria or Lebanon wanted 
to promote—drug trafficking was a profit-making business in the Bekaa Valley prior to 
Syrian intervention and flourished for three decades under Syrian supervision.  In 1992 
not much had changed; the State Department’s narcotics report read, “U.S. officials 
believe that individual Syrian soldiers and other officials stationed in Lebanon’s Bekaa 
Valley, as well as some higher level officials, are involved in the drug trade.  This is in 
contradiction to the stated Syrian government policy…”161. 
G. THE BEKAA VALLEY 
The importance of the Bekaa Valley to the Lebanese drug trade cannot be 
understated.  It was once ‘Lebanon’s breadbasket—rich with wheat, fruit and vineyards’ 
but was eventually transformed into a major narcotics cultivating region, eventually 
seeing its product sent as far away as the United States.  Eitan Azani provides a plain, to 
the point descriptive of the Bekaa and drugs—  
The people of Beqaa… engaged in growing and trading drugs.  They were 
tough and assertive and opposed any representation of authority in their 
region.162 
All the literature researched on drug trafficking and Lebanon point to the Bekaa 
Valley as the epicenter.  The region benefited from drug dealers operating in the Bekaa 
Valley because hashish made up a minimum of 10 percent of the cash crops within the 
valley.  In other words, Lebanon’s major narcotics cultivation, refining and trafficking 
provided a necessary economic stimulus to the region.  
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Correspondence between FBN agents included pictures and descriptions of 
hashish fields that continue on for as far as the eye can see.  Farmers of the Bekaa Valley 
had a choice—cultivate a crop that is illegal both domestically and internationally and 
make a sustainable living, or cultivate a crop that yields a return considerably less and 
struggle to survive.  In the absence of a more lucrative crop, local farmers will grow what 
is in demand and politicians will encourage that which puts money into state and personal 
bank accounts.  A commodity that was desired throughout the international market and 
that brought a higher price than food crops turned Lebanon’s breadbasket into a money 
till for Lebanese politicians and Syrian military officers.  
The close relationship between politics and hashish was reported back to the State 
Department in Washington, D.C. whenever new information came to light. A narcotics 
agent stationed in Lebanon in order to understand the relationship and to see the 
connections between individuals provided the following descriptive account of the drug-
politician relationship. 
The President of the Republic of Lebanon is the Chief Executive of the country.  
Under him is the President of the Chamber of Deputies, which is composed of deputies 
from the five districts, namely—Bekaa, South Lebanon, North Lebanon, Beirut, and Mt. 
Lebanon.  Narcotic Agent Charles Siragusa did not mince words when describing the 
direct connection between political position and narcotics trafficking in 1950 Lebanon 
when he wrote: 
Practically the entire production of hasheesh [was] in the fertile Bekaa 
valley, in the Bekaa district of the ‘feudal lord’ and President of the 
Chamber of Deputies—at the time Sabri Bey Hamede.  Since he [was] the 
biggest landowner it [was] an accepted fact that the vast marihuana farms 
are either his property or rented by him to others.163 
It was speculated that when there were governmental pushes to repress hashish 
production, the only acres cultivated with hashish that were destroyed were those of  
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Hamede’s competitors.  So, not only did Lebanese politicians in 1950 use their positions 
to shield themselves from legal prosecution, but they also used them to get rid of any 
competition.   
One can understand after careful examination of the FBN records that drug 
trafficking through Lebanon was firmly established by the middle of the 1950s.  
Narcotics were flowing out of, into and through Lebanon from the countries surrounding 
it, opium from Turkey via Syria on to Europe, cocaine from Europe into Lebanon, and 
hashish grown locally and exported.  Those participating in, or rather controlling, the 
drug trafficking operations were most often influential figures or held a familial link to 
powerful political figures able to garner cover for their illicit activities.  According to 
Robert Fisk, even though hashish production was officially illegal, “the 30 wealthy 
Lebanese families who controlled the crops were both politically and militarily 
powerful.”164  Also, it has been suggested that couriering was often done in diplomatic 
pouches during official government travel, providing diplomatic cover.  Does this mean 
that high-ranking political figures are solely culpable for laying a foundation in the drug 
business for future political figures or organizations?  No, but it does establish the fact 
that Lebanese politics and drug trafficking have a shared history.  
H. DRUGS IN LEBANON (1960s AND BEYOND) 
Drug trafficking continued through Lebanon in the 1960s and the 1970s, leading 
up to the beginnings of the civil war in 1975.  Processing plants for heroin and opium 
poppies proliferated with the help of international gangs during this period.  In fact, drug 
cultivation flourished in the Bekaa Valley during the lawless years of the 1975–1990 civil 
war, mostly under the watchful eye of Syrian military officers.165  At the onset of the 
civil war, “a war economy developed in which militia leaders could accumulate profits 
from… the export of the refined products of cannabis and the opium poppy – both grown 
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in the Bekaa Valley.”166  The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime data shows 
Lebanon was the major producer of illicit drugs in the Middle East during this same 
period.   
In the late 1980s illicit cultivation reached its peak. Cannabis cultivation was 
estimated as high as 11,000 to 16,000 hectares during the peak years and yielded up to 
1,000 tons of cannabis resin.  Opium poppy, which was introduced in the 1980s, grew 
rapidly from 3,500 to 5,000 hectares yielding 3 to 5 tons of heroin.167 
From 1991 to 1993 Lebanese and Syrian forces attempted to once again eradicate 
illicit cultivation in the Bekaa Valley. While significantly reducing the cultivation of 
opium poppy and cannabis, the eradication campaigns were not integrated into a more 
comprehensive program and were therefore not successful.  In fact, eradication in the 
absence of alternative income sources had an immediate negative economic impact on the 
population.   
Driven by dire financial difficulties following the 1990s, many farmers reverted 
back to the cash-cow crops of hashish and opium poppies.  Farmers blame the 
government for years of neglect and the Lebanese government blames the international 
community for failing to follow through on promises of agricultural and economic aid to 
farmers in the Bekaah168-Hermel region.  According to Beirut’s daily newspaper, Al 
Anwar (June 13, 2001), Agriculture Minister Ali Abdullah stated, “Donor countries have 
reneged on their promises to finance agricultural projects in the Bekaa valley.”169  He is 
also quoted as saying, “If the farmers have resumed cultivating the illegal crop, it is not 
because they want to do so but because they have been forced to do it due to the difficult 
living condition.”170  
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The Minister’s comments highlight the very real fact that drug trafficking is not 
motivated by greed alone; real socio-economic crisis pushes the cultivators to participate 
in this process.  According to a report by the French news agency, AFP, referenced in 
The Middle East Reporter, “Lebanese authorities are turning a blind eye to the return of 
drug cultivation in remote areas of the Bekaa valley.  The ‘authorities’ flexibility has 
encouraged the inhabitants of 150 villages, out of 2000 to return to the cultivation of the 
illicit drugs.”171  No one is certain how large an area is being cultivated.  Estimates vary 
between 2,000 and 5,000 hectares.  Some estimates go as high as 35 percent of the whole 
Ballbek-Hermel area. 
I. THE FRENCH CONNECTION 
Nations would often like to believe that what ties them together is a shared 
culture, brought from one state to another as people immigrate with hopes of a new and 
better life.  That is most certainly true in many cases.  New York’s Ellis Island has been a 
beacon of hope for millions of individuals looking to make a fortune in the land of 
endless opportunity.  Unfortunately, good intentions are not always the only luggage 
brought by people entering the United States.  Drugs and the desire to build a market for 
those drugs are often what cross into the United States from countries far away—five 
thousand, six hundred twenty-two miles away to be exact.  Beirut, Lebanon is on the 
eastern border of the Mediterranean Sea and by all accounts a long way from New York 
City, but it played a pivotal role in one of the most well known drug trafficking stories of 
the twentieth century—The French Connection.  
By 1961 narcotics trafficking out of Beirut, Lebanon was firmly established to 
countries like Egypt, Italy and France. The genesis of this story is not Lebanon, but 
Turkey; however, Beirut played a very important processing and shipping role in the life 
cycle of heroin on its way to New York City.  On December 16 a shipment of 51.1 
kilograms of nearly pure heroin, over 112 pounds, arrived in Montreal via France. New 
York City was the culmination of its life cycle.   
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The narcotics started in Turkey where the poppies were cultivated and the opium 
harvested.  It then made its way to Lebanon where the oily, musk-scented brown paste 
was sold and chemically reduced to a powdery, white morphine base.  This potent base 
was then conveyed clandestinely to the sophisticated refineries in the south of France 
around Marseilles.  Here it was chemically processed further into the drug known as 
heroin and made its illicit passage throughout the world.  The load that arrived in 
Montreal could be expected to turn over as much as $32,000,000 on the street.  
Theoretically, it was enough to supply every addict in the United States for eight months.  
It was the largest single shipment ever attempted.172 
Grunt police work was responsible for bringing the individuals involved in the 
French Connection to justice.  The network of narcotics traffickers that stretched from 
Turkey to New York City via Lebanon and France had lost this round of a seemingly 
endless war on drugs.    
J. CONCLUSION 
Narcotics have been more than just another of Lebanon’s social ills.  They have 
been an unfortunate contributor to the development of Lebanon and its political system.  
Those involved with drug trafficking within and through Lebanon have not been a 
faceless mass of the underprivileged.  Douglas Valentine states matter-of-factly in his 
book The Strength of the Wolf, “In Lebanon… the major hash growers were legislators 
and officials of cabinet rank.”173  People of influence and means have attached 
themselves to the illicit marketing of drugs in order to partake in the large profit margin 
they afford.  We know that the overwhelming majority of narcotic cultivation occurred, 
and continues to occur, in the Bekaa Valley.  This geographic area, historically tied to the 
Shi’a, has been ripe with narcotic cultivation for decades and has fostered a corrupt 
political environment from which Hezbollah was born and now finds it self leading.       
                                                 
172 Valentine, Strength of the Wolf (New York, NY: Verso, 2004), 66.   
173 Valentine, Strength of the Wolf (New York, NY: Verso, 2004), 170.   
 67 
IV. HEZBOLLAH AND DRUGS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter chronicled the development of Lebanese socio-political 
confessionalism and the eventual fifteen-year civil war that almost destroyed the country.  
This chapter will focus greater attention on the Shi’a of Lebanon, Hezbollah in particular, 
and its involvement in drug trafficking.  Although its predecessor Amal had raised the 
voice of the Shi’a earlier, it was Hezbollah’s rise “out of the heat of the resistance 
battle”174 that truly provided the Shi’a of Lebanon with a strong voice and international 
attention.  Some western governments have labeled it a terrorist organization.  At the 
same time, its supporters defended it as a domestic political organization and the only 
proven resistance movement against Israel.  While these titles are true, they fail to 
comprehensively capture the character of the group.  Hezbollah is also a pragmatic and 
calculating organization that constantly analyzes the ‘profit and loss’ considerations of all 
its actions.  To that end, I hypothesize that Hezbollah, by virtue of its positional authority, 
geographic origins and international influence, controls a large portion if not most of the 
drug trafficking moving through Lebanon.  And as such, it has been co-opted into the 
very system of corruption it vowed to fight during its genesis.       
Historically, the politically elite of the major confessional groups have controlled 
drug trafficking throughout Lebanon.  However, the violence between and among 
confessional groups often overshadows issues such as drug trafficking.  Instead of being 
seen as a significant contributor to the socio-political landscape of Lebanon, drugs are 
seen as a symptom of other more ‘important’ problems such as governmental ineptness, 
declining agricultural opportunity and corruption.  However, I propose that drug 
trafficking is just the other side of any one of these issues.   
Evidence points to Hezbollah’s smuggling cocaine from Latin America into 
Europe and the Middle East, after having previously smuggled opiates from the Bekaa 
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Valley in Lebanon.  During the previous decade, Hezbollah has consistently cooperated 
with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) to export narcotics into Europe.  It is safe to 
assume that Hezbollah involvement in drug trafficking and other illegal activity is 
increasing as sponsorship funding from regional interests (Iran and Syria) likely 
decreases.  To that end, recent revelations about Hezbollah prove that the politically elite 
continue to utilize their seat of power to pursue an unjust dollar.   
According to recent reporting by The New York Times, United States officials 
accused the Lebanese Canadian Bank of laundering money for an international cocaine 
ring with ties to Hezbollah.  This public accusation resulted in the exposure of the bank’s 
ledgers and more importantly shed light on a dark secret: the clandestine methods that 
Hezbollah uses to finance its operations. The books offer evidence of an intricate global 
money-laundering apparatus and new insights into the murky sources of Hezbollah’s 
money.  The bank appeared to let Hezbollah move huge sums of money into the 
legitimate financial system, despite sanctions aimed at cutting off its economic lifeblood. 
Mark Rubin, a resident scholar at American Enterprise Institute, is not surprised by 
Hezbollah’s use of legitimate institutions to launder illicit funds.  Lebanese banks are 
known for their involvement in money laundering since at least the 1950s.175  
While law enforcement agencies around the world have long believed that 
Hezbollah is a passive beneficiary of contributions from loyalists abroad involved in drug 
trafficking and a grab bag of other criminal enterprises, intelligence from several 
countries points to the direct involvement of high-level Hezbollah officials.  One agent 
involved in the investigation compared Hezbollah to the Mafia, saying, “They operate 
like the Gambinos on steroids.” 176  
The rise of the Lebanese Shi’a to a position of political authority and social 
influence did not occur overnight.  Throughout most of their history in the region, the  
 
 
                                                 
175 Rubin, Mark, Resident Scholar American Enterprise Institute.  Interview by author, January 30, 
2012, Bahrain.   
176 The New York Times, December 14, 2011, A1.   
 69 
Shi’a population has been a quietly enduring group most often detached from the centers 
of power and privilege.  Their connection to the region is not, however, something 
completely unknown.  So let us begin at the beginning.        
B. SHI’A ORIGINS IN THE REGION 
Establishing an exact date that the Shi’a population was established in modern-
day Lebanon is open to conjecture due to the paucity of written records on the subject.  
Oral traditions of Shi’a scholars of South Lebanon teach their founding by Abu Dharr, a 
companion of the Prophet and a strong supporter of Ali’s claim to the caliphate. 177  Early 
twentieth century scholars, such as Phillip Hitti and Henri Lammens, claim that the Shi’a 
communities are descendants of the Persians and still others postulate the present day 
Shi’a families have their roots in Yemenite tribes.178   “However Shi’a Islam was 
established, it is apparent through written records that by the tenth century Shi’a groups 
were widespread throughout Syria (including Lebanon, Palestine and East Jordan).”179   
In the eleventh century, three local Shi’a dynasties (Buyids, Hamdanid, Isma’ilis 
Fatimid) each enjoyed a moment of glory.  However, from the twelfth century onward the 
Sunni orthodoxy majority reduced the Shi’a in the region to the status of dissenters. 180  
Over the centuries, the Shi’a congregated in two main areas of modern-day Lebanon.  
The first was Jebel Amil (Mount Amil), which is that part of the Lebanon mountain range 
in Southern Lebanon between the Shouf and northern Galilee.  The second was in the 
northern reaches of the Beqaa Valley, around the towns of Baaleek and Hirmil.   
Each group of Shi’a followed a distinctive path of development.  In the Jebel 
Amil region, rain-fed agriculture predominated.  Most worked the fields for the benefit of 
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landowning families (zuama), who in turn provided them with protection and arbitrated 
their disputes; a feudal system.  In the northern Beqaa, the Shi’a were more nomadic and 
existed in a series of clans.181  The Shi’a, politically marginalized and economically 
disadvantaged, did not play a major role in the events that shaped the environment around 
them until well into the twentieth century.       
 
Figure 1.    Areas of Shia concentration in Lebanon (From: justworldnews.org182) 
C. SHI’A DEMOGRAPHICS—OUT WITH THE OLD, IN WITH THE NEW 
By the time of the 1932 census (the only one ever taken), Lebanese Shi’a was the 
third largest community.  The geographic isolation they had been subjected to, however, 
                                                 
181 Helena Cobban, The Shia Community and the Future of Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: American 
Institute for Islamic Affairs, 1985), 2. 
182 Justworldnews.org, (accessed February 2, 2012). 
 71 
kept them apart from the political center of Beirut.  The different strata of the community 
mentioned in the previous section continued along traditional lines until the mid-1960s 
when demographic changes in Lebanon began to result in noticeable changes within the 
Shi’a community.  “The move from the village to the city, the expansion of education, the 
change of employment patterns (contributing to a middle class), the emergence of new 
competitors in the form of Lebanese leftist parties, and the power struggle amongst elites 
posed a threat to the elite and gradually diminished its control over the power sources and 
its influence in the community.”183  It is estimated that between 1952 and 1964 the 
residential population of Beirut tripled,184 mainly due to transplanting Shi’a.   Some 
authors (Johnson, Fawaz, Khuri) contend that the mass migration of Shi’a to the cities has 
been steady since Le Grand Liban was established185, or mostly occurred prior to186 or 
during the 1920s.187    
When the Shi’a moved from the rural outskirts to the bustling cities is not as 
important as why, and the resulting attitudes toward government.  The agricultural 
opportunity in the predominately Shi’a areas of the country began to change from a labor-
intensive market to a capital-intensive market, resulting in many uneducated farmers 
looking for laboring jobs in Beirut’s building industry.  The internal migration proved 
key to Shi’a politicization because “it gave rise to a large, discontented and marginalized 
minority ripe for political leadership.”188  As a result, the power vacuum once filled by 
familial elites (zu’ama) was filled by the two big Shi’ite movements—first by Amal and 
then by Hezbollah (out of the Bekaa Valley).    
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D. BEKAA VALLEY—NEXUS OF SHI’A ACTIVISM AND DRUGS 
The area of modern day Lebanon has been internationally important as far back as 
the Roman Empire, during which time “the Bekaa provided imperial Rome with a 
sizeable portion of its grain.”189  Unfortunately, times have changed the landscape of the 
valley and for some time now this area has become known for the cultivation of two 
seemingly different things: Shi’a ideological activism and drugs (mostly hashish).  Bill 
Weinber blatantly stated, “Whoever holds the fertile Bekaa [Valley] holds the ticket to 
power.  As the war escalated in the late 1970s, hashish, the traditional mainstay of the 
Bekaa, started to be replaced by the more lucrative heroin.  Marijuana fields were 
converted to opium fields and hashish production compounds converted to heroin 
labs.”190  In other words, the Beqaa Valley provided an ideal environment for social and 
agricultural opportunism, at times simultaneously.  
Before proceeding, it is prudent to make sure the reader understands that the 
Shi’a, although the focus of this chapter, are not the only group with a history of 
involvement in the Lebanese drug business.  According to Valentine, “the Maronites 
were deeply involved in financial crime and hashish smuggling”191 prior to the French 
mandate.  And in his book Drugs, Oil and War, Peter Scott highlights Syria’s 
involvement in the Beqaa with respect to drugs by mentioning the “heroin-financed 
intelligence activities among Muslims of men like Rifaat Assad, who controlled the drugs 
and laboratories of Lebanon’s Bekaa valley.”192  Also, according to an executive 
intelligence report, “Syria angled to maintain a controlling interest in Lebanon, viewed by 
Assad and his friends in Israel as a highly profitable plantation for opium and hashish 
cultivation.”193  
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Those in power, regardless of affiliation, did not facilitate the narcotics trafficking 
in a social vacuum.  Poor farmers trying to provide for their families were willing 
participants in the cultivation of drugs throughout the region.  Why?  The cultivation of 
hashish yields a greater return on investment than, say, vegetables or tobacco.  According 
to Azani, “the people of Beqaa engaged in growing and trading drugs.”194  And Norton 
states, “The hardscrabble Shi’a farmers could not subsist on what they earned growing 
tobacco, vegetables or fruits.  In the northern Beqaa ...poppies and hashish became 
valuable cash crops”195, and well into the 1990s “the economy remained heavily 
dependent on agriculture, including illicit drug cultivation.”196  It is naive to believe that 
narcotics trafficking throughout any region continues purely because “the government 
does nothing to help... and there’s no other substitute”197, and therefore cultivation 
continues.  The money that it provides all involved in this illicit activity is far greater than 
profit yields from legitimate ventures.    
The individuals who developed and controlled the drug trade throughout Lebanon 
may not have all been Lebanese and were of different confessional groups, but they all 
held a keen interest in Lebanese politics.  Historically, those individuals have been the 
socio-political elites of most of the major confessional groups and Syrian military officers 
operating in the Beqaa.  Michael Johnson, a fellow at the Centre for Lebanese Studies, 
Oxford, supports this argument matter-of-factly in his book Class and Client in Beirut 
when he stated, “the warlords of Lebanon ran the hashish and heroin export trade… and 
various other rackets”198.  The individuals that controlled the political power in the 
country also controlled a great deal of the economic opportunism.     
Drugs have been and continue to be grown in the Beqaa Valley.  But, why do I 
emphasize drug trafficking throughout the Beqaa?  It is also the launching point for 
Hezbollah.  In fact, some of the same agents that enable drug trafficking in Beqaa gave 
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rise to Hezbollah.  The great distance “from the centers of control and influence (of the 
Amal movement, the Lebanese government, and Israel), but proximity to Syria 
empowerment allowed Hezbollah to develop almost unhindered its first year.”199  Also, 
Shanahan calls attention to the fact that “in its early days, Hizbullah was a movement 
based largely in the Biqa’ [where] Iranian influence was the strongest and Hezbullah had 
the greatest freedom of movement because the Israeli invasion of 1982 had not penetrated 
into it.”200  Therefore, geography is extremely important when examining the 
relationship between Hezbollah, its rise to power and the proliferation of drug trafficking 
through Lebanon.   
There is a connection between Hezbollah, the Beqaa and drugs, but in order to 
understand this connection more fully it would be prudent to establish greater familiarity 
with Hezbollah as a Shi’a organization and its place within the Lebanese political system.  
A discussion of Hezbollah logically begins with its predecessor and first large-scale 
mobilization of Shi’a communities, Amal. 
E. AMAL (HOPE FOR THE SHI’A?)   
The arrival in Lebanon of Imam Musa al-Sadr ushered in a new era in the history 
of the Lebanese Shi’ites.  He was born the son of a leading Lebanese Shi’ite scholar, 
Ayatollah Sadr al-Din Sadr and studied under Ayatollah Mohsen al-Hakim in Najaf 
during the 1950s.  Al-Sadr “set out to activate the politically quiescent Shi’ites and 
organize them as a formidable political force” through the adoption of a “reformist 
ideology comprising a potent combination of traditional values and modern concepts.”201  
In other words, al-Sadr believed that Lebanese Shi’a should abandon the traditional idea 
that political disenfranchisement was an inevitable result of the Shi’ite position in 
Lebanese society and begin taking an active role in the Lebanese political system.   
The activism of Imam Musa al-Sadr began to slowly move the Lebanese Shi’a 
from the periphery of Lebanese society toward its center in the 1960s and 1970s.  By 
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1969, following massive Israeli bombing raids on Palestinian bases in South Lebanon, 
Musa al-Sadr’s efforts resulted in the establishment of the Supreme Islamic Shi’ite 
Council, “a democratically elected organization entrusted with the responsibility of 
representing the Shi’ite interests and religious endowments.”202  The council was the first 
of its kind in Lebanon and a giant step towards providing Lebanese Shi’a with a public 
voice.    
In his most famous speech delivered in the Biqa Valley city of Ba’albak on March 
17, 1974, Imam Musa al-Sadr laid out the grievances the Shi’a had against the Lebanese 
government and launched his popular mass movement, Harakat al-Mahrumin (Movement 
of the Deprived).  “With his movement he vowed to struggle relentlessly until the 
security needs and the social grievances of the deprived—in practice the Shi’a—were 
satisfactorily addressed by the government.”203  Shi’a grievances included political 
disenfranchisement, government corruption, lack of government investment in Shi’ite 
dominated areas and insufficient security provided against both internal (PLO) and 
external (Israel/Syria) groups.  Through unrelenting determination, al-Sadr transformed 
the Lebanese Shi’a from a passive and isolationist people into a mobilized collective 
group working towards the realization of social and political goals.204      
Although this organization was founded to operate within the existing political 
system, it is worth noting that in 1975 al-Sadr’s organization developed into a military 
movement known by its acronym, Amal (Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyyah, or 
Battalions of the Lebanese Resistance)205.  It may have been the original Shi’a hope but it 
did not automatically attract a majority of the politicized Shi’a.  The Shi’a communities 
had grown tired of Palestinian heavy-handedness and living in fear of the encroaching 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but Amal proved ineffectual in solving either problem.  By 
the late 1980s, Amal was overwhelmed by the needs of ‘their’ constituents and weakened 
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from constant fighting.  “What had been a dynamic and progressive movement in the 
early 1980s, with extensive popular support, became a full-blown patronage system with 
all the corruption, inefficiency, and inequity that Amal had long ascribed to the 
traditional zu’ama.”206  A call to action by men demanding more than words and symbols 
was about to begin.  
F. HEZBOLLAH 
Hezbollah emerged under the banner of radical Islam in the summer of 1982 as a 
cabal of several different Shi’ite groups (Hizb al-Da’wah, Amal, Islamist wing of Harakat 
Fatah, Lebanese Communist Party).  The collective group began training in several 
locations throughout the Beqaa under the tutelage of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard that 
had entered Lebanon following the 1982 Israeli invasion; however, formal declaration of 
Hezbollah’s existence did not occur until the release of its open letter in 1985.  The letter 
was addressed to the ‘Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World’ and served as their 
political manifesto.  In it, “Hizbullah outlines three guiding principles—belief in Islam, 
jurisdiction of the jurist-theologian, and jihad.”207   
It was an accumulation of different events from 1979–1982, both external and 
internal, that provides the answer to why Amal was eventually seen as an inefficient 
representative of the Shi’a people and why Hezbollah was able to establish itself as the 
premiere Shi’a militia and political organization.  Eitan Azani summarizes three strategic 
events that he believes (and I agree) set the stage for Hezbollah’s genesis: “Operation 
Litani, the disappearance of Ayatollah Musa al-Sadr, and the Iranian revolution.”208 
The first strategic contributor to the development of Hezbollah was the entrance 
by, and protracted stay of, Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.  Operation Litani (March 
15, 1978), initiated to push the Palestinian guerrillas north of the Litani River, led to a 
two decade long Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, displaced hundreds of thousands 
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of Shi’a from southern Lebanon, and rendered Hezbollah’s ideology palatable to many of 
the Shi’a in the region.209  The disproportionate consequences heaped on the Shi’ite of 
southern Lebanon led the UN Security Council, on March 19, 1978, to adopt Resolution 
425, which called for the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops and the deployment 
of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).  The agreement that was 
eventually reached called for “the cessation of PLO military activity and partial Israeli 
withdrawal, which translated into handing over the area to its ally, mainly a Maronite 
proxy militia, the South Lebanese Army (SLA).”210  An armed Maronite presence in a 
predominately Shi’a area provided Israel with a near ally, but did nothing to improve 
contentious confessional relations.   
The SLA is an interesting organization, but no different than any of the other 
proxy groups supported by outside forces with a selfish interest in the balance of 
Lebanese political power.  “The Israelis set up [the] new, 2,000 man ‘South Lebanese 
Army’, overwhelmingly Maronite-officered,”211 and provided a “host of Israeli 
‘advisers’”212 that remained in the ten-kilometer-wide security zone meant to serve as a 
defensive buffer along Israel’s northern border.  Truth be told, the area provided Israel 
with a greater ability to take offensive retaliatory action against nearby Palestinian 
refugee camps.  In theory, the protracted Israeli presence in the predominately Shi’a area 
was to aid the SLA, but in reality it “let the genie [Hezbollah] out of the bottle”213 
according to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1987, who was later assassinated.  Israel’s 
most decorated soldier and future Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, put the matter succinctly 
in July 2006: “When we entered Lebanon...there was no Hezbollah.  We were accepted 
with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shi’a in the south.  It was our presence there that 
created Hezbollah.”214     
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The mysterious disappearance of al-Sadr while on a trip to Libya in August 1978 
was the second strategic contributor to Hezbollah’s creation cited by Azani, and fit nicely 
within the Shiite teaching of the ‘disappearing Imam.’  It became obvious to the religious 
leaders of the protest movement that this “disappearance provided the community with 
the necessary motivation for the continuation of a social protest.”215  However, 
propagandizing the disapperance of al-Sadr split Amal leadership between the cleric 
members of the Supreme Shiite Council and the new Shi’ite militants attracted to the 
sense of religious identity generated by an activist interpretation of Shi’ite ideals.216 
The Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) was the final event that Azani points to as 
holding significant strategic importance in influencing the Shiite of Lebanon.  There was 
a connection between the Shiite of Lebanon and the Iranian system through Iranian 
exiles, family ties, and the Shiite Ulema in Najaf and Qom (religious centers of Shiite 
teaching).  “The Islamic revolution in Iran changed the regional power equations and, at 
the same time, became a source of pride and emulation for... the Shiite movements.”217  
The Shiite of Lebanon had been shown that a religious revolution could achieve victory 
over the secular regimes propped up by the West.  
The 1982 Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon to attack PLO strongholds was 
the proverbial ”straw that broke the camel’s back”, and highlighted Israeli ignorance of 
the Shi’a and their indifference to the “warning delivered by the Israeli Arabist Moshe: 
‘Do not join those who murdered Husain, because if you bring the Shia to identify you 
with the history of [their] suffering, the enmity that will be directed at you will have no 
bounds and no limits.”218 The Israelis rolled into Lebanon bent on destroying one enemy, 
the PLO, but the net result of their operations that year created another, Hezbollah. 
Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s current Secretary General, insisted from the start 
of the organization that Hezbollah was first and foremost a nationalist resistance 
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movement required to protect the interests of Lebanese Shi’a, fight against the corrupt 
secular Lebanese government, and bring about the establishment of Sharia law 
throughout the country.  In other words “the ideological framework of Hezbollah was 
religious and pan-Islamic and it aimed at the establishment of an Islamic regime in 
Lebanon since it considered the Lebanese government as corrupt and illegitimate.”219  
Participation in the political process was initially not an option because corruption of the 
current government was a rally cry for Hezbollah’s followers and at its start Hezbollah 
did not command the means or the manpower necessary to seize power in Lebanon.  
The manner in which Hezbollah originally went about attempting to establish an 
Islamic regime is anything but heroic from the perspective of anyone outside of the Shi’a 
communities within Lebanon.  Militant Shi’ite Islam within Lebanon, without argument, 
built its foundation upon ingenious forms of violence.  Put plainly, Hezbollah is infamous 
for promoting the idea of suicide operations as a duty of all pious Muslims.  Khomeini, 
Hezbollah’s religious leader, justified those who undertook suicide attacks as doing the 
will of Allah and thus they would be rewarded for their sacrifice.  Hezbollah’s violence 
forged a movement out of despair, injustice, and suffering into focused rage toward a 
corrupt Lebanese government and the America that supported its policies. 
During the decade between 1982 and 1992, Hezbollah’s violent resistance 
established it as a permanent non-state actor on the international stage.  The limits of 
violence were eventually reached so Hezbollah was required to modify its tactics and 
return to that which they abandoned in Amal, the struggle for ideas.  Pragmatism 
gradually dampened Hezbollah’s idealism so that its strategy of jihad eventually focused 
on not only military strength but also the political capital that came with winning hearts 
and minds.  In other words, idealism was tempered with pragmatism.     
It is interesting to note that prior to the 9/11 attacks Hezbollah was responsible for 
more U.S. deaths than any other organization—1983 attacks on the U.S. Embassy in 
Lebanon and the bombing of the Marine Barracks resulted in 302 American deaths.220  
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Based on just those two pieces of Hezbollah history, it is not difficult to see why the 
United States labeled Hezbollah a terrorist organization in 2001.  But is Hezbollah to be 
defined solely on one aspect of their past?  If the answer is yes, why not define them by 
the great number of social programs they established and continue to run.  
G. SOCIAL WELFARE, TERRORISM, OR POLITICAL PARTY 
Feed those who need it, but do so especially when or where the sources of 
sustenance, physical, moral or spiritual are cut off 
– Quran, v.6141 
Hezbollah was born in violence aimed at a corrupt central government and 
meddling external forces; however, its leaders quickly learned that it needed to broaden 
its base and sink its roots firmly into the community.  They accomplished this through 
joining the fight against IDF (Israel Defense Forces), providing the social services the 
government was either unable or unwilling to provide, and eventually fighting the 
political process from within by putting forth political candidates during elections.  These 
two facts are important because they demonstrate a pragmatic evolution of Hezbollah’s 
socio-political views and offer a convenient and legitimate means by which to launder 
illicitly gained profits.  Am I suggesting that Hezbollah immediately began participating 
in drug trafficking in order to finance its social programs?  There is no evidence 
suggesting that, so any assumption to that effect would be merely conjecture.           
Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary General, Naim Qassem, describes the purpose and 
intent of the social service section in the following passage: 
Hezbollah paid particular attention to social work. Not one aspect of 
aiding the poor was neglected as the party worked towards achieving joint 
social responsibility, answering the urgent needs and introducing 
beneficial programs. Such work was simply considered Party duty, and 
concentrated efforts towards raising funds and making available social 
service resources served towards achieving these goals. The Party worked 
to the best of its capabilities, cooperating with official institutions to 
respond to societal needs.221   
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Put simply, Hezbollah’s social programs are focused, deliberate efforts to meet 
the needs of those in need, with the potential political payout being infinitely more than is 
invested.   
The social service section of Hezbollah has demonstrated the ability to meet the 
Lebanese community’s needs in a manner far superior to the central government, and has 
become so important that it is estimated to have allocated an estimated 50% of its 2007 
budget to the social service effort.222  As a result of Hezbollah’s generosity towards the 
Lebanese people, it need not worry about legitimacy and is, I believe, able to take 
liberties at the expense of the very people it helps.   Examples of Hezbollah’s safety net 
include The Jihad al-Binaa (JBDG), Islamic Health Organization, the Martyrs 
Foundation, the Women’s Association, the Imam al-Mahdi Scouts and the education 
division.223  This is not a comprehensive list of Hezbollah associated organizations, but 
merely a glimpse at the means by which Hezbollah has ingratiated itself towards the 
Lebanese people.  
Why are Hezbollah’s social programs important?  And what relationship do they 
have to drug trafficking?  The government of Iran may invest a large amount of money in 
Hezbollah, but it doesn’t provide nearly enough to cover Hezbollah’s obligations.  Money 
is important and there are no legitimate capital-raising means equivalent to drug 
trafficking.  Illicit money is not the only enabler of Hezbollah, and the money laundering 
capability that legitimate businesses provides is invaluable.  The problem of drug 




                                                 
222 Bane, Interview with Special Operations Command Levant Analyst. Exact budgetary figures are 
not available. The annual budget for Hezbollah is within the range of $500 million to a $1 billion annually. 
The figures in this chapter and in the funding chapters are approximations based on interviews and 
secondary sources. 
223 Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & 
Commemoration Center (IICC), "Hezbollah: Profile of Lebanese Shiite Terrorist Organization of Global 
Reach Sponsored by Iran and Supported by Syria (Parts I and II)," (2003), 137. This is not a comprehensive 
list. The organization chart lists the primary groups. 
 82 
addressed holistically.  Therefore, “unless the 'legitimate' network is countered, no 
amount of drug interdiction efforts would have so great an effect on Hezbollah 
capabilities.”224  
H. CONCLUSION – ENDS JUSTIFY THE MEANS 
Hezbollah “began as a cat’s paw of Iran, a righteous, violently militant collection 
of young revolutionaries who had no time for mundane politics”225, but has transformed 
itself into  “a sophisticated organization with different functions, including financial, 
judicial, social, political and military matters.”226  Testimony before a joint hearing of 
Congress estimates that by 2006 Hezbollah’s estimated annual budget to be around 100 
million dollars (a very conservative estimate), most of which came from Iran. 227  In 
addition to the Iranian aid Hezbollah has received over the years, money is raised through 
fundraising in Lebanon and through disparate communities all over the globe, to include 
South America, Europe, West Africa and even the United States.  Hezbollah’s 
governmental representatives are also able to utilize their political position to obtain 
Lebanese government funding for projects within the Shiite population centers in 
Lebanon. 
According to Frank Cillufo, Associate Vice President at George Washington 
University, speaking before Congress, “Drugs provide an opportunity to break free from 
state sponsors whose support may be dwindling or politically conditional.  Hezbollah, for 
example, got into drug production in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley to fill the void when 
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funding from Iran declined.”228  In addition, the Shiite group Hezbollah has long engaged 
in drugs-for-cash deals, with operatives smuggling cocaine from Latin America (often by 
way of the notorious “tri-border” region, where Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina meet) to 
Europe and the Middle East.  In the past, Hezbollah has also “smuggled opiates out of 
Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, a lawless area that is a haven for drug smugglers and Islamic 
terrorists… for the terrorists, drug trafficking serves as a lucrative means to further their 
jihad against the West.”229  Hezbollah is not the first group to take advantage of the 
fertile soils of Bekaa Valley, but they are the latest to utilize drug profits to support their 
socio-political machine. 
Hezbollah successfully entered the political game in 1992.  Since then it has 
become more entrenched in the mainstream political process with each successive 
election; however, Hezbollah has never forgotten its roots as a resistance movement.  
Interestingly, “Its dual role as a resistance movement and a political party has resulted in 
‘Hezbollah’s oscillation between militancy and political pragmatism in the pursuit of its 
goals.’”230  
Hezbollah is a complex organization that seems to defy a universal definition. 
First, it was a nationalist resistance movement that was established to fight against a 
corrupt central government unable to protect its people from outside interference. Then, it 
quickly became a grass roots organization that understood how to take advantage of the 
enormous political capital that results from managing social welfare programs for the 
Lebanese people (Muslim, Druze, or Christian).  Hezbollah has been labeled a terrorist 
organization by the United States for its glorification and utilization of suicide bombings, 
two of which were directed at the United States in 1983—the Marine Barracks and U.S. 
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Embassy in Beirut—resulting in over 300 people killed.  Finally, Hezbollah is a 
‘corporate-like’ organization involved in legitimate businesses, but also unequivocally 
linked to illicit activities around the world.  According to the Palestinian leader Yassir 
Arafat “the forces at work in the Arab world are like sand dunes that constantly form, 
alter, merge, and blur without respect to borders.  Since the midpoint of the twentieth 
century, several of these metaphorical ‘dunes’ have drifted into each other in 
Lebanon.”231  It is my contention that one of those dunes was, and continues to be, 
narcotics trafficking.  The winds blew so powerfully against the metaphorical narcotics 
dune, that its sands began to fall within the United States and therefore caused U.S. law 
enforcement to focus its attention on Lebanon.   
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V. CONCLUSION – PROFITS AND POLITICS 
An attempt has been made throughout this thesis to discuss the complex nature of 
the Lebanese political system and the influence that drug trafficking has had on shaping 
it; specifically, how drug trafficking has contributed to the development of Hezbollah.   A 
study on the effects drug trafficking has had on Hezbollah’s development really requires 
the assumption of one thing only - that drugs are used as a highly lucrative commodity.  
For example, “drug cultivation flourished in the Bekaa Valley during the lawless civil 
war years (1975-1990) and constituted a main source of income for the Lebanese 
treasury, estimated at $4 billion in 1989.”232  The financial windfall drug trafficking 
creates enriches and empowers its participants.  In fact, drug trafficking was concerning 
enough to the United States government by 1930 that the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
(FBN) was established to address the increasing problem of international drug trafficking 
into the United States.  FBN agents were sent out to intercept the problem of drug 
production at the sources, and one of those sources turned out to be Lebanon.  Despite the 
FBN agents’ best efforts to hinder drug trafficking into the United States from Lebanon, 
production and trafficking within Lebanon continued for many years to come, centered 
around the Bekaa Valley.   
Many years into a confessional war, a militant social movement began to 
materialize within the same fertile valley.  This group of young men, angry with the 
political incumbents and perpetual corruption, was small in number but determined to 
change the direction that the Lebanese country was traveling.  Hezbollah began with the 
blessing and means of Iran, but has evolved into a “complex, multi-faceted organizational 
apparatus [with] domestic activities in Lebanon and far-reaching transnational 
operations.”233  A large-scale organization like Hezbollah requires a substantial 
mobilization of financial resources to support itself.  The foremost answer to the 
question, “Where did Hezbollah get its money?” has always been Iran.  A majority of 
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researchers would agree that approximately $100 million is supplied annually to 
Hezbollah.  However, that is not nearly enough to cover the intelligence-estimated annual 
expenditures of around $500 million.234  Profit margins for drug trafficking are colossal 
and could more than make up for any shortfalls that Hezbollah may experience.    
The argument may be attempted that points out a lack of direct proof of 
involvement by Hezbollah senior leadership in drug trafficking.  That point is noted, but 
not relevant to this thesis.  Direct involvement of senior leadership in drug trafficking is 
not required for the organization to profit for the activity.  There is evidence however to 
suggest an apathetic attitude toward where supporting monies come from, by the most 
senior Hezbollah leader, Sheikh Hassan Nazrallah.  In a letter of appreciation to Arab 
businessman Assad Barakat, Sheikh Nazrallah “acknowledged [Barakat’s] continuous 
contribution and support for the children of those who fulfill their promises to God, 
becoming martyrs, who generously sacrificed their blood...”235.  This statement may 
appear to be merely a benign comment or a genuine thank-you for legitimate support to a 
worthy cause.  But the fact that Barakat is a ‘funds transmitter’ operating in the Triborder 
region of South America236 raises questions about the potential injection of illicitly 
gained funds into legitimate Hezbollah interests. 
In order to fully understand the importance of drug trafficking as it relates to the 
development of Hezbollah, and to more importantly provide closure to this thesis, a 
comparison of Hezbollah to another resistance organization, the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Columbia (FARC), would be helpful.  Outlining the development of this 
organization and then comparing it to Hezbollah will provide the reader with at least one 
other relational perspective between drug trafficking and political resistance.  I offer the 
assertion that there are several similarities between the two organizations, mostly  
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occurring during the first couple of years of each group’s development.  But there are 
also subtle differences that I believe contributed to different opportunities and 
development.  
Colombia, like Lebanon, is a country that has a rich history influenced by political 
unrest, nationalist resistance movements and the drug trade.  Colombia never experienced 
major international conflicts, but had been in an almost permanent state of civil unrest 
since independence. Armed insurgent and terrorist groups are identified with Columbia’s 
history of unrest and FARC cannot be separated from the political violence that affected 
Colombia.  In fact, the unstable and violent political environment known a ‘La Violencia’ 
(1948-1958) was directly responsible for the generation of FARC.237  By 1964, the 
FARC, along with other communist groups, had emerged out of ‘Independent Republics’ 
and expanded their influence slowly over the next decade.  Its development into a 
guerrilla force controlling over forty percent of the nation by 2000 was “due largely to 
the organization’s participation in the drug trade and its involvement in other illegal, yet 
highly profitable activities.”238 
A series of meetings among resistance leaders, referred to as ‘guerrilla 
conferences,’ yielded a “strategy of reactive defensive operations directed at long-term 
conflict with the ultimate goal being the seizure of state power.” 239  FARC’s strategy 
reflected the revolutionary euphoria of the 1960s.  It is interesting to note “the majority of 
FARC members were drawn from vulnerable peasant colonizers...who turned to FARC 
for protection and for organizing basic infrastructure.”240  The gradual rise of the FARC 
also involved the integration of students and middle-class intellectuals into an insurgent 
movement typical of the Cold War era.  From an initial membership of only “43 
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guerrillas, the FARC swelled to an estimated 16,000 to 18,000 combatants by 2001, 
making it one of the largest insurgent organizations in the world.”241  
With respect to the FARC, there is a debate over whether these insurgents should 
be considered political activists or criminals. According to Pulido, the monograph, ‘The 
FARC Cartel,’ reflects the view that insurgents are nothing more than drug cartels.242  
But Colombian academic Eduardo Pizarro Leongomez argued that the “FARC has not 
discarded political ideals in favor of private enrichment.”243  Former Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee staff member Roger Noriega argued, “While the popular moniker 
‘narcoterrorist’ may overstate the relationship between the guerrillas and drug traffickers, 
it is clear that a symbiotic tie exists between these illegal groups.”244  I don’t believe just 
one ‘label’ completely encapsulates any organization.  FARC, like Hezbollah, is not 
defined by only one aspect of its organization; whether it be socio-political resistance, 
social welfare programs, or narcotics trafficking. 
Whether the FARC is driven by greed or grievance is an interesting question to 
consider. However, it is clear no matter what its motives the FARC dramatically 
increased its connections to the illicit drug trade during the early 1990s.245  This 
increased connection to drugs as a source of revenue, likely to fund military capability, 
was first authorized during the 7th Conference of 1982.246  But it was the window of  
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opportunity provided by governmental targeting of narcotics traffickers, and the resultant 
weakening of the drug cartels that lessened competition in this area and for the first time 
in the early 1990s the FARC revenues were substantially increased.  The main source of 
revenue came from taxing peasant growers in their zones of influence and by contracting 
out their services to the trafficker organizations to protect crops, processing laboratories 
and landing strips.247  The FARC’s realization of the potential profits led them to “pursue 
many other forms of taxation, and further integration into other facets of the illicit drug 
industry to include airfield security and drug refinement.”248  Increased monetary 
capacity meant increased capacity with respect to personnel, training and armament, 
resulting in a military force capable of challenging the central government.   
In the late 1990s admittedly spotty evidence hinted that some FARC ‘fronts’ 
might have begun to operate their own processing facilities in remote areas of the 
country.  There was, however, no indication that FARC personnel engaged in 
international drug smuggling activities outside of Colombia.249  FARC leadership replied 
to accusations of FARC involvement in Colombia’s drug trade with the statement: “The 
truth is that we do not depend on coca.”250  Columbian military leadership, in particular 
General Fernando Tapias, Commander of the Colombian Armed Forces, insisted that the 
opposite was the case: “I do not believe that anyone in Colombia or the world can doubt 
the links between drug trafficking and the rebel groups...”251.   
While income from the drug trade has certainly bolstered the FARC financially, it 
would be a mistake to conclude that drug money was in the past, or is now, essential to 
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the continuation of the FARC’s war against the Colombian government.  In the first 
place, there are a number of FARC income-producing ‘fronts’ that have never depended 
on either coca or opium poppy ‘rents’ to sustain their activities.  Second, declines in 
income from drug sources could, and in all likelihood would, be made up by increasing 
earnings from kidnappings, extortion and revolutionary ‘taxes’ on peasants, landowners, 
businessmen and foreign multinationals.252  
Recent events (not relevant to this thesis) have demonstrated that the FARC has 
lost some of its influence and is now a marginally effective political and military force. 
To the surprise of its supporters and its opponents, the FARC is clearly a shell of what it 
had been at the start of the 21st century.253 
While the FARC and Hezbollah are similar organizations, at the same time they 
are very different.  Both began in a predominately rural environment, drew the majority 
of its membership from the underprivileged class, and were eventually turned to by those 
most vulnerable in society for protection and basic needs.  Hezbollah seems to have 
transitioned more seamlessly than the FARC however.  Perhaps this is true due to 
outward interests and their manipulation of the internal Lebanese political landscape.    
Ideologically speaking, both organizations began with an intransigent outlook 
toward the incumbent powers.  FARC demanded a blatantly secular, Marxist-Leninist 
approach to governance within Colombia, while Hezbollah espoused a Shi’a Islamic state 
reminiscent of the Iranian theocracy for Lebanon.  Both groups developed a military 
force capable of defending its supporters and projecting offensive power against its 
enemies.  And both organizations have participated in the political process to some 
extent.   
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Political participation is probably the area in which Hezbollah and FARC are the 
most similar.  Although Hezbollah vowed never to participate in the corrupt Lebanese 
political structure, it has been a willing participant since the1992 elections when it fielded 
as many eligible candidates as it could. Hezbollah’s leadership learned quickly that 
“ideological intransigence can [quickly] lead to disaster”254, so instead of trying to 
change the political system through the barrel of a gun, Hezbollah has slowly become the 
controlling party through elections.  This does not mean that Hezbollah has given up its 
guns.  Hezbollah has been able to justify its disregard for the Ta’if Accords, which 
required the disarming of all confessional militias, by bringing up the constant threat 
posed by another potential Israeli invasion.  The FARC also eventually softened its 
ideological package to deal with the Colombian central government, and as such 
transformed the nature of their competition with the state.  In other words, throughout the 
1990s the FARC “gave special importance to gaining a share of power at the municipal 
level within the state.”255  The FARC and Hezbollah each exposed their government’s 
“incompetence in dealing with the countries’ biggest problems (social inequality, crime 
and deficient public services), and presented themselves as a credible alternative for good 
government.”256 
The research on the FARC appears to show that it more openly embraces the 
utilization of criminal activities (narcotics trafficking being just one example) to support 
its ‘corporate’ and ‘social’ ventures, but Winer and Roule state with complete certainty 
that “members of Hezbollah are linked to drug trafficking in Lebanon.”257  Why is this?  
Hezbollah has been able to transition from nationalist resistance movement to militia to 
political power almost effortlessly while still remaining a little of all of them.  The 
FARC, on the other hand, has reached an agreement with the Colombian government to 
maintain control of the autonomous regions from which it began, but has never truly 
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transitioned from being a nationalist resistance movement into a legitimate political 
player.  Whatever the reason for its stagnation, the FARC seems to be satisfied with its 
current condition.   
I began this thesis with the argument that the control of narcotics trafficking 
through the Lebanese state has disproportionately influenced the political landscape of 
Lebanon, contributed to the disenfranchisement of many confessional groups—the Shi’a 
in particular, and as a result contributed to the rise of Hezbollah.  In other words, the 
openness that defined Lebanon’s success also led to its failures.  Many researchers have 
looked at Lebanon and decided that Confessionalism, a fragile political environment 
resulting in a perpetually weak central government, and internal meddling by Lebanon’s 
neighbors and imperial powers, have contributed more to its fractured history.  It is true 
that Lebanon is a sum of its parts (i.e., religion, politics, economy), parts that can be 
examined individually but are never defined completely independent of each other.  
Lebanon must be looked at systemically and unless the drug trade, its influence on 
Lebanese politics, and the consequences of such a relationship are given more than just 
passing acknowledgement, the problem will continue to hold disproportionate influence 
within Lebanon and abroad. 
“Although centered in Lebanon, Hizbullah and its front organizations reach out 
across international boundaries as regards operations and fund-raising efforts.  Their 
financial tentacles reach across the world...”258.  Hezbollah sits upon the social, economic 
and political mountain of success that it has built upon successful socio-economic support 
of the Lebanese populace.  Yes, it has been the recipient of Iran’s support since its 
inception, but it has grown beyond the means that Iran initially provided.  Its influence 
and economic reach is truly international.  The following quotes taken from an Alison 
Jamieson writing (although not referencing Lebanon or Hezbollah) and Augustus Richard 
Norton are fitting closures to this thesis.  
Those who accumulate profits of thousands of billions [of lire] cannot be 
without a political project... It is the means whereby they enter the legal 
                                                 
258 Rudner, “Hizbullah Terrorism Finance: Fund-Raising and Money-Laundering,” 709. 
 93 
market, take over banks or other economic structures; it is the beginning 
of the transformation from criminal system to political system.259 
Politics, whether among Muslims or non-Muslims, are dynamic and 
contingent.  It may be tempting to assume that behavioral verities are 
driven by ideological commitments, but the lessons of Shi’a politics in 
Lebanon point in a very different direction.  Political constraints and 
opportunities are the desiderata (something that is needed or wanted) of 
political behavior and ideology takes a back seat....The game of politics 
may erode ideals, but the vast majority of Hizballah’s followers want to be 
in the game.260 
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